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'DIE  GEIDAL  PIOTORE 
'DLia  nrve7 vas cend.v.cted in the ten co11ntriea of the Balropem Ooanmi  ties 
at the request ef the Directorate-General tor EDergr of the o  ...  iaaion of 
the European Oemmunitiea. 
Between Karch and Jla;y  1982  m  identical aet et tvent7 qv.eationa was  pv.t  to 
national representative aaaplea of the pepulatien aged fifteen 8l'ld.  over, 
the total n'lllllber  of people involved beilag 9 700.  Each individual vas 
interviewed at home  b7  a  professional interriever.  The  av.rve7  vaa carried 
ov.t  b7 specialized institutes, all ••bera of the European Olmi.bv.a  Surve7• 
'!he  Blll"Y87  vas baaed on three objectives.  In the first place, the  a1.a  vas 
to find.  ov.t  what  Europe81181  thought  about  energy problema in paeral azul 
abov.t  nv.clear aergy, in partiOlllar.  At  the aaae tiae, it would be 
possible to ascertain,  'b3'  comparison with the rea1Llta of previ01l8  111U"V8781 
whether or not public opinion had.  changed and,  if ao,  what  direction it had 
taken.  Last, but not least, the intention was  to discover jut how 
vell-illf'o:naed the pu.blio vas  on energ matters.  'What  follows ia a 
fifteen-peint  B11mm&r7  et the moat  salient renlta of the surve7. 
BRERGY  AID  DIJORIIA'l'IOB 
1.  For the past ten 78ar&  energ haa been a  regalar tront-paae feature  a 
n.ppl7 pro'bleas,  the price of petrol,  relations with prod•cer onntriea, 
the llll•PlOJIIent crisis in trad.iticmalq coal-baaed. areas,  resea:rah into 
Dew  nergr aovcea,  the pros and cons of nv.clear power,  azul  ao en. 
SituatiollB develop aDd ._, even reaelve th  ...  elve&J  the experts do not 
&lva.J11  ooncrur.  JlrOJI  this jllllble et intomatie aacl  opinion,  a  nuaber of 
upeots will hit home  to the pablio, though the overall picture aq net 
'be  clearl.7 defined. 
2.  Eurepe8D8  take a  rather dia view et the intel'llation on ener17 
problems offered to thea b7 the press,  radio,  television or edaoational 
bodies.  This  ahOllld  ooae aa no  surprise aa other at1141es  han alre~MQ' 
ahom that the public is iaolined to blaae the maaa  aeclia tor its own 
ipor&Dce. 
3.  The  T&Bt  aajorit7 of Eu.ropema hold national pvel'lllllents,  above all 
ethers, respeuible for 81'1ergy aattera B1loh  aa  the aatet7 of D1lclear 
l'Ower  statieu or research inte new  eaergy s011r0es.  It would,  however, 
be wrong to aaiJWile  that the7 therefore think that all 001111tries  ah01lld 
act entireq independeatq in this field..  Previoua  811r'ft78  have shown 
that three n.t of.  tov.r Eu.ropeaas believe it iaportaDt to achieve a  oo.aen 
ener&Y  poli07. 
1  The  tem "Earopeana" ia ued. here aDd  throughout the report to 
indicate natioaala of the tea K  ..  ber States of the BUropeaa  eo..unitiea. II 
ERRGY  SUPPLY 
4•  Etl.ropeana  tod~ are beset vi  th anxieties about  the h.t11.re  of the world 
and of the society in which we  live.  Prospects for oil and  gas supplies, 
upon  which three-quarters of our energy OOillfiDption is baaed,  are not 
regarded as a  major cause for oonoem.  li'evertheless1  two  in three 
Eu.ropeans  are aware that there is 1111  energy problem,  anc1.  it is generall;y 
thought that the situation will worsen over the next ten years. 
5·  Earope&D  Collmnmity  households account for the direct ooiUillllption of 
just ever a  quarter of the total amcnmt  of energ prod•oedJ  one  08D only 
wonder at the ver,y large quaati  ties ef domestic appliances uid other 
energy-consuming pods involved.. 
6.  .Alaost  everyone  (nine oa.t  of ten people)  claims to have made  at least 
one attempt to save energ in recent years.  Such  savings have been made 
predominaDtly in connection with heating and electricity, rather than 
petrel.  Given the willinpess that is apparent at present  1  there is still 
scope for encouraging further savings. 
7.  When  it comes  to solving the problem of meeting demand,  by far the 
most  popular option is that of increasing research into renewable  energy 
sourcesz  solar energy,  the biomass,  tidal power,  etc.  'lhe  second an.d. 
third. choices are the increased or reneweci  exploitation of traditional 
energy sources (coal,  lignite or brown.  coal 8Dd  peat) ud energy-saving. 
Nuclear power takes fourth place.  Only a  ver,y •all proportion are in 
favour of blving supplies from  abroad,  which indicates either a  aore or 
leas conscious desire tor national independence as far as energy is 
concemed1  or else considerable ignorance aa to the present lenl of 
dependency. 
'l!IE DEVELOHIEtlT  OF  BUOLEAR  R>WER 
8.  Given a  straight choice between developing md not developing nuclear 
power,  the public is clearly divided:  3~  are in favour ot developaent, 
37tJ,  reject it because it involves \ID&Oceptable  risk md the rest either 
fail to see 8D7  advantage in it or "don  1t  know". 
9·  Four years ago the same  question prompted a  more  or leas similar 
response in the Community  as a  whole.  This apparent similarity maaks1 
however,  considerable shifts iri opinioll which var,y from  countr,y to 
ocnmtry.  In France,  Ge:m&D7'  and the B'etherlan.da  opilli.on has tended. to 
become  favourable.  In Luxembourg,  Demaark,  Ita17,  the United Kingd011 
and,  above all, Irelan.d,  the opposite is tNe.  Belgi111l  is the only 
countr.v where  there has been no  apparent  chmge. In 
Chuges have come  about as a  result of two  factors:  ( 1) increased or 
decreased belief in the beneficial aspects of n'llClear power ("it ·is 
worthwhile") ;  ( 2)  increased or decreased fear of nuclear power  ("the 
riaks invel  ved are \IDaoceptable").  '!'he  weight  carried by eaoh of the two 
ill the. changes of opinio~ that have ooou.rred since 1978 varies from  one 
co1111t17  to another.  In Germazay,  for example,  it Call be aeen that fear 
haa diminiahed,  rather than that there has been any great inoreaae in 
belief in the beneficial aapeots.  In Lux•  bourg and Demaark,  the trend 
observed is due mainly to increased fear;  in the United Kingdom,  Ital7 
azul  Ireland, it can be explained in terms of both factors,  although loss 
of belief in the value of nuclear developaent takes precedence.  In 
Jranoe and the Netherlands public opinion has changed on the basis of 
both factors in equal measure. 
10.  Attitudes towards nuclear power vary oonsiderabl7 from  one 
European ocnmtry to another. 
In France,  which is the most  advanced  COIIIDlUDi t7 country in the nuclear 
field,  public opinion has shifted in recent years with the result that 
the majori  t7 is now  in favour of development. 
Geman public opinion has also moved  in this direction and  fear of the 
dangers  i.Dherent  in nuclear power has diminished.  However,  whilst there 
are now  more  supporters than opponents in Ge:rmazay,  the former are still 
far from  being a  majorit7 because so many  others are undecided. 
In the United Xin&dem,  on the other hand,  public opinion has been 
affected by the doubt  cast on the economic benefits of nuclear power. 
The  oountr,y is currentl7 split evenly between those tor and  those against. 
:Belgian public opinioD has hard.l7 al  tared over the tour years.  It is 
predominantl7 hostile,  less through fear of the dangers involved than 
because of a  loss of faith in the economic benefits. 
ID  the Netherlanda  and.  Italy,  which are both countries where  there is 
little nuclear developaent,  public opinion is similar, i.e. predominantly 
anti-nuclear;  however,  whereas the tendency over the last four years has 
been favourable in-the lfetherlanda,  in Italy the opposite has been tra.e. 
Lastl7,  in those o01mtries where there are no  nuclear power plants, 
public opinion is clearly hostile and  baa become  more  markedly so over 
the past four 78&rS•  In Ireland and  in Greece,  there are three times 
as m&rq'  opponents as there are supporters of the nuclear option. 
11 •  Leaving aside any national differences,  the tendency for Europeans 
to adopt  a  right-wing or a  lett-wing political stance is undoubtedly the 
most  influential factor when it OODles  to attitudes towards the developaent 
of nuclear power.  This tendency should not,  however,  be interpreted as 
meaning that attitudes are necessarily unif'o:rma  a  sisnif'ic&Dt minorit7 
of lett-Wing aupporters is sho1m  to be in favour of the developaent of 
nuclear power,  while the right includes a  fair DlDilber  of'  opponents. IV 
PDBLIC  PJmCEPI'IOlf  OF  :tmCLEAil  R>WER 
12.  In all ocnmtriea the position adopted with regard to developing 
IIU.Clear  power atatiou ia ver.y cloael.7 linked vi  th the notion that 
"it we  don1t,ve shall soon be obliged to limit our electrioit7 consumption". 
However,  the ored.ibili  t7 ot thia argument  does not consistently encourage 
support for nv.Olear power stations.  · It would seem  then that a  nWRber  of 
Earope8D8  would prefer restricted  aoot~ss to eleotrioi  t7 to increased 
auolear oapaoit7.  In reoen.~ ,.ears then,  the argmaent has lost ita edge. 
13.  Al  thngh Eu.ropeana  see leas danger in having a  nuclear power .  plaat 
in the neighbourhood. than in living near a  chemicals or explosives 
tactor;r, ver.r few people  (~) would  entirel7 rale out the possibilit7 
of an atoaio bomb-type explosion at a  maolear power station.  One  oazmot 
help utioimg the general lack of basic technical knowledge.  As  far as 
Ealropeans  are ooncemed,  the risk involved in storing radioactive wasta 
is the most  frightening aspect:  it opens up visions of a  distant, hazily 
perceived future in 1dlich d.aagers appear all the more  horrendous tor 
being inoaapletel7 defined. 
14.  !he at~  of prevailiDg atereot7JNtd notions ooDCeming n11clear power 
ataticma 11011l.d.  appear to reveal a  certain •01Ult of oono8D.8l1.81  a great 
deal of prej~oe aDd  a  strong dose of ignorance.  !here is considerable 
oou8D.BWI  amongst  Baropeana on two  pointas  "'lhaDka to auclear power 
atatiOJIUI,  we  ~1  have available extra resources of eleotricit7" ad 
"ll11clear power stations can be daDgeroua for the people that work in th•". 
'!he aost widespread prejudices are expressed in statements auoh  as  "'lhe 
Dlllll&l'O\UJ  s75tems of aecuri  t7 precautions are a  clear indication that by' 
their ver.r D&tllre power stations are d.azl&erou11  aacl  "The  expansion of the 
DDber ot 11110lear  power atationa is d.ai:J.gerou".  Opponent  a  to nuclear 
power ovel'Mhelmingl7 agree with these statements,  whereas  the majorit3' of 
those in favour ahow  soae oonoem.  '.the  greatest ignorance is apparent 
when it 081lea  to the ~eat  ion .of 1dlether II'Uolear power is a  ole811  form 
of energ aDd whether it is cheaper to produce. 
15·  Opponents to the develoJIIent of nuclear power SJ111:eaatioallJ  ..  adopt 
the acre radical poaitien, particnll.arl7 aa rep.rds riaka,  rejecting the 
notion of eooDOIIic  'beneti  ta or tald.ng retage in abatanticm.  ihoae who 
npport DUolear power take a  aore bal8Doed view&  although the7 are aware 
of the eoonoaio and technical arguments in favour,  they do  not deJV that 
there are riaka illvolve4. v 
OOIOLUSIO:I 
Attitwdea to energy problema in the :Jmoopea Comnnity are oharaoterized. 
by a  fair~ n,pertioial .  awareness of the riaks of &  breakd.om ia supply, 
ocnaplecl.  with a  atroDg eaotioB&l response,  d.emoutrated in the ohoice of 
solv.tiODB. 
"Fair~ n.pertioial" beoaue althoush a  reasonable majority have heard of 
the aergy crisis ad acknowledge it to be a  seri011S  probl811  \loth now  and 
in the lcmg tem, there is a  general taill11'8 to aake the oonneotion between 
D&tioD&l- ud inte:rA&tio:nal-soale problems  azul the individual ooDS1111ler. 
In partioular, higb-level energy oonnmera and nationals of the richest 
oountries tad to plq clown  the energy orisia.  Low-level  ooDSUIIlers  &114 
people living in the poorer oouatries,  en the other hand,  show more 
awareness,  Du.t  almost as if the energy orisis were merel.7 one aapeot of 
the dittioalt eoonomio  aitll&ticm faoi:ng their OWD  o01Ultriea. 
'!he aotional response to the qaeation of possible solutions is discerned 
in the choice of the most  l'OJiaDtio,  "bllt  teohnioall.7 and  economical~ the 
least  reati~vailable solution - renewable energy souroea.  On the other 
hand,  the m1.0lear option still evokes fear, despite the tact that it has 
l1DC101ibted.l7  been a  auooess in those ocnmtries where it baa  been adopted 
on a  large scale. 
'Dumlat to the aeries of opiDion polls commissioned 'IJ7  the Evopean 
eo.aunitiea, it has been possible to trace the evol11.tion over the last 
ten yea.ra of Earopean attitudes to variou topical isaueaa  oonnmption 
aDd oonnaeria, regional imbalance,  social matters, 11D•plo1J18Dt  or the 
retil  ...  ent age,  aoi81ltifio and.  technical develo]llents,  eto.  lhergy,  aad. 
aore  especial~ BU.olear  811.erQ1  can be seen to elioit the widest variation 
iD respcmae  fl'OIIl  one  0011Dt17  to another. 
~  or anti-ma.olear atti  t114es  depeDd  apparently on the payohologi.oal 
phOJUaencm  of critical tistaaoea  Dllolea.r aergy ia onl.7 reall7 accepted 
once it haa 'bea developed on a  nttioient aoale.  Whm  a  001llltJ7 is 
....  i tted to a  mtolear poli07 8114,  aore to the point, when  nuolear power 
pl8Dts  acrhal~ exist not far trea home,  installations of this ld.Dd 
appear to lteceae aore  pal~table.  Oonverael7,  the farther removed.  froa the 
reali  t7 of Dllolear power,  the more  the pablio is perivbed by it, and the 
greater ita oonoem at the thought that suoh · highlJ-threatening 
installations aight aotuall1' aaterialize. 
JD7 aiacivinp tlle aupporiera aight have spring aa.imly f'rom  the feeliDg 
that whilst at present the prodllOtion azul ue of BUOlear  energy are 
pveraed by a  reaaoll&Dl7 reliable set of conventions azul  oondi  tiona 
(i.e. the "rriles of the game"),  there would 'be  a  grave d.aDcer if society 
lost a.ntrol of the situation.  Such  a  loss of control aight be 
occasioned 'b7 ailit&%7 ues, aots of terrorilllll or even,  quite aimpl7, 
an uoeasive proliferation of power stations.  It ahould be stressed at VI 
this poi.Jrt  that the rillka iJrvolvecl ill power atation operation are a 
caaae of leas ooncer.m  thaD the atorace of radioactive waatea. 
It ia iaportut to \Uld.erat&Dd.  that the pro- IIDC1  anti-nuclear factions 
tead.,  a  the whole,  to argue f:Na difterut preaiaeal  the adversaries 
either d.ezq or are 1111ava.re  of the inhe1'81lt  economic  advantages;  the 
npportera tad to pl8\J' clown  the risks 8lld dancers involved,  without 
ao'tu.l.q pi.Dg so far aa to deJV' that theae uiat.  It is lUld.eratanda.'bly 
d.iftiftlt·, therefore,  to ilaitiate a  clialop.e 11»etween  the tw sides, let 
alone t17 8DCl  reconcile thea, if they are not 79t oonviaced. of the tams 
ot the d.e'bate. 
'lhe  81ll"'l81'  reveals that the pu.blio is still not recei  v:Lng adequate 
information 81ld that this absence of iDf'ormation in i taelf nurtures 
oonoem beoauae the level of'  ipor&Dce on this nbj  eot is ve17 
ocmsidera.'ble.  It IIIUit,  howner,  be atresaed that the information 
received will onl.7 be credible in so far u  it issues t'roaa  authorities 
truted 'b7  tlle pablio to deal with such aattera.  In this respect,  the 
Earopean Ooa1mi  ty is fairq well regarded by the pa11»lio  which sees it, 
albeit as yet i.Ddistinotq, as a  potential source of action. PART  ONE:  INIBGY  TODAY -2-
I.  DAILY  USE  OF  ENIRGY 
!he most recent statistics place annual energy consumption in the 
ten Member  States of the Buropean Community  at a  level of around 700 
·million toe, ot which  27J6 is accounted for"  by household consumption.  In 
other words,  just over a  quarter of the total aount of energy conslD!led 
in the iuropean Community is dependent on the decisions, attitudes and 
habits of ordinar.y, people in their daily lives. 
Macro-economic  statistics show  that domestic energy consumption per 
head of the population varies considerably from  countrr to country within 
the Community.  '.l'b.e  greatest consumers  are Luxembourg,  the Betherlands, 
Denmark,  0en1'181V  and Belgium;  Ireland and Italy both have  a  low level of 
consumption,  while Greece  has the lowest of all. 
I.  BOUSIHOLD  BQUIPMIIlT 
Household energy consumption takes m.aD7  forms:  heating, lighting, 
vehicles,  household appliances, etc.  It would not be within the  scope ot 
this survey to attempt to catalogue,  even approximately, all the outlets 
for energy consumption present in the householdsof intertiewees.  It 
seemed  appropriate,  however,  to establish a  few  basic factors in 
connection with energy-consuming appliances, particularly tor the purpose 
of the analyses  (given below)  of attitudes towards the eneru- crisis, 
possible savings and  the future ot nuclear energy.  AccordiD8l7,  a list 
of eleven items vas used to assist this research. 
Thus  9ntl ot European households can be seen to possess a 
refrigerator,  88}6  a  washing machine,  74%  a  telephone,  7~  a  car,  68,16  a 
colour television, etc.  These  percentages var,r considerably from  countr.r 
to countr.r,  as is shown in !able I  • -3-
'fable I  - PERCENTAGE  OF  EUROPEAN  HOUSEHOL:OO  II POSSESSION  OF  THE  POLLOWING 
PIECES  or EQUIPMEHT: 
L 
IlL 
D 
DK 
UK 
r 
B 
I 
IBL 
GR 
EC 
Fridge 
97 
98 
95 
98 
98 
98 
93 
98 
90 
97 
97 
Wash- Tela- Car  Col- Cen- Elec- Sepa- Sepa- Dish- ~  125cc 
ing  phone  our  tral  tric  rate  rate  wash- motor-
mach- TV  heat- tools water- frees- er  bike 
ine  ing  heater er 
98  93  79  71  80  79  67  7'  " 
4 
91  88  68  81  69  69  82  41  10  6 
90  63  70  84  74  62  38  63  30  10 
13  88  69  75  75  63  20  80  25  2 
88  82  68  83  64  65  59  44  5  9 
86  82  eo  60  7'  58  56  37  2'  5 
82  50  76  78  56  58  57  52  19  ., 
9'  74  78  46  55  44  54  20  16  14 
77  '5  71  70  '9  '5  46  18  7  6 
61  57  44  13  41  26  63  2  4  5 
88  74  73  68  65  57  53  I 
41  18  9 
lB.  Countries are classified according to the average  number 
of items possessed (last column) 
Average 
number 
out of 
11 
7.76 
7.05 
6.88 
6.70 
6.67 
6.58 
6.30 
5.92 
5.06 
4.20 
6.46 
The  average  number  of i tams  per country can be  seen to relate very 
closely to the estimate of per capita domestic  energy consumption based on 
the available macro-economic  data (correlation coefficient:  .891). 
Since the data collected in the survey on  household equipment  can thus 
be  regarded as  ari efficient indicator or a  country's general energy 
consumption level, it is worth reflecting for a moment  on  the differences 
between  the various countries. 
The  disparity between  them  is more  or less marked  according to the 
various types of equipment:  in almost all cases,  Luxembourg  is the most 
highly-equipped:  conversely,  Greece  is generally the least well-equipped. 
Overall,  the differences are minimal  when it comes  to refrigerators 
(9o-9~), slight in the case of washing machines  (61-9~); substantial in 
that of colour televisions  (13-8~) and  considerable for dish-washers 
(4-3"'). -4-
The  data presented thus far give an  overall picture of the average 
situation in each country in tems of energy-consuming  equipnent.  However, 
the considerable differences between  countries are also reflected within 
the individual countries.  Generally speaking,  the answer  distribution 
curve for the number  of items possessed is a  normal  curve  (Gaussian 
distribution);  this being so, interviewees have  been divided into three 
troupe  (each corresponding more  or less exactly to one  third of the total 
sample). 
~  should emphasise that each person is classified according to 
national consumption criteria.  Thus,  in order to be included in the "high-
level consumption"  bracket (top third) Luxemburgers  and  Germans  must 
possess at least 9 of the  11  i terns  listed; Greeks,  on  the other hand,  need 
only possess 6 or more. 1 
It will thus be  possible to establish whether or not opinions on 
energy matters vary in relation to an individual's classification as a 
low- or high-level consumer  in comparison with the national average. 
1 
Luxembourg  and  Germany 
Wether  lands 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Prance, 
Italy, Un1 ted Kingdom 
Ireland 
Greece 
Number  of items possessed 
(out of the  11  listed) 
low-level  average  high-level 
consumption  consumption  consumption 
1 - 6  7.  6  9 or more 
1  - 6  7  6  or more 
1  - 5  6.  7  6  or more 
1 -'  4·  5.  6  7 or llOre 
1 -' 
4·  5  6 or more (2) 
-5-
II.  THE  PROPENSITY  TO  SAVE  ENERGY 
As  a  result of the disastrous oil crises in recent years,  European 
governments  have  recommended  that the public adopt energy-saving measures, 
both in the national interest and for its own  benefit.  How  far have  these 
measures been successful? 
A high proportion of Europeans  claim to have  already' made  savings on 
beating, electric!  ty and petrol in recent years.  !hese answers  should 
undoubtedly be  regarded as indicative; they cannot give any concrete idea 
of the actual savings made.  Nevertheless,  Europeans  are clearly willing 
to save energy. 
Question:  In recent years, have  you  personally done  any of the following 
things? 
Overall 
have  already done  so 
Reduce  heating costs by improving  the 
insulation in your home  (e.g. double 
glazing,  improved  roof insulation, 
adjustment of the controls of your 
beating equipment,  etc.) 
Reduce  heating costs by  reducing the 
temperature or amount  of heat you  use 
Cut  down  petrol used in your car (by 
using the car less, by driving more 
gently, etc.  ) 
Economise  in lighting or the use of 
other electrical appliances you  have 
in your home 
44%) 
) 
) 
5~) 
) 
) 
) 
,9}6  ) 
) 
) 
) 
5~) 
Total of those who  have  taken at 
Total > 91 
b7 virtue 
of multiple 
answers 
least one  of the above measures  9'1% 
Those  who  have  done  none  ot the 
above  ~ 
100}6 
Thus  nine out of ten Europeans  claim to have  taken energy-saving 
measures.  This is a  considerable proportion, varying little tram countr.r 
to country (maximum:  98}6 in GermarJ7,  minimum  82)6  in Ireland). -6-
There is stUl room  for further energy-saving:  7~  of Europeans  think 
that they could save more  (in particular,  ,.~ could cut down  more  on lighting 
and the use of electrical appliances,  2~  could reduce  their petrol 
con81Dilption,  2~  could manage  with less heating and 2'1%  could further 
improve their insulation and re-adjust their heating controls).  There is 
not,  however,  the  same  willingness to do  these things in all the countries 
concerned:  eight or nine out of ten in Genn&Il7,  Italy and Ireland said 
that they could make  further savings; in  lranc~_ only five out of ten said 
they could, whereas results for the remaining countries were  somewhere 
in between.  1 
Prom  the answers received, it can be seen that an order of priority 
exists with regard to the areas in which  savings seem possible or bearable: 
- there is considerable reluctance to  cut down  on petrol which appears to 
represent an  ~portant personal need; 
- making  savings on  the heating is more  acceptable to some,  although its 
scope is probably limited; 
- voluntary reduction in electricity consumption seems  to be  the least 
painful means of saving.  It is doubtful,  however,  whether the 
villingness shown  in this area can be of any real use if it simply 
amounts  to remembering  to turn the light off when  leaving a  room  or 
using electrical appliances somewhat  less frequently.  Nevertheless, 
this is an area in which a  certain amount  of cooperation could be 
expected if the public were better informed. 
1  The  diagram on the following page illustrates the position of the various 
countries with regard to the  two  questions mentioned above.  !he scope 
for further savings, measured in terms of willingness, is all the greater 
in a  country in which  a  high proportion have  already taken such measures. % Who  .· aonsider 1  t 
possible~:~tc)  .. make 
fUrther ·  savings 
90'..----; 
-7-
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!he position of each  countr.y is descri 
Fig.  1a 
b7·a·point·for:which the X•axis 
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claim to have  made  energy-savings  and 
the Y-axia,  the P,roportion ot those  who 
think they coul  do  more 
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Savings alread7 made  and potential savings: 
relative positions of the various countries 
%  having alread7 
made  savings -8-. 
It should be added that the fact ot having made  savings in a  specific 
area acts as an incentive to make  further savings in the same  area:  those 
who  have  al.ready cut down  on lighting are more  willing than others to go  on 
doing so;  those who  have  reduced their petrol consumption are more  persuaded 
than others that it is scope for further reduction;  those who  have  reduced 
their heating plan to make  further cuts;  those who  have improved their 
insulation are more  convinced that they could do more  in this area.  Actual. 
experience thus serves to teach and  to instil conviction. 
!b complete the picture of attitudes to energy-saving, which are based 
on both the financial aspect and  concern for the community as a  whole, 
there are the replies to an additional question:  "I» you  feel that other 
people in your neighbourhood could do  more  about energy saving than the1 do 
now  and in which ways  in particular of the few  I  have  mentioned~"  There is 
a  general tendency to feel that others could do  more  and that petrol 
consumption,  above all, is the area in which they should do  more. 
Saving on heating 
Saving on lighting and electricity 
Improvement of insulation and 
adjustment of heating controls 
Reduction in petrol consumption 
SELF 
I»ne so  Could do 
al.ready  more 
%  % 
55  23 
53  33 
44  21 
39  23 
OTHERS 
Could  do 
more 
33 
42 
!o what extent does  belonging to the high-level or low-level energy 
consumption  group in one's own  country affect one's decisions with regard 
to  energy-saving~  Within all three groups the  same  proportion claimed to 
have made  savings,  but not in the same  areas  (with the exception of saving 
on heating which was  frequent in al.l three groups) •  The  low-level 
consumption group cut back mainly on lighting and electricity whereas  the 
high-level consumption group tended rather to improve their insulation and 
to re-adjust their heating controls. -9-
or  those belonging to the 
following consumption  groups: 
Have  already' made  •••  OVERALL  low-level  average  high-level 
%  %  %  % 
savings on  heating  55  52  56  57 
savings on  lighting and 
~J 
electricity  5}  52  49 
improvements in insulation 
and adjustment of heating 
~ 
controls  44  }2  45 
reduction in petrol  · 
consumption  }9  Z1  44  45 
'l'otal ot those who  have 
already made  savings  91  91  91  92 
II.  EIERGI  SUPPLIES 
European  concern tor the  tut~e  .-ot the world can  take a  host ot forms. 
~re  does  the energy crisis figure amongst all these?  Happily before 
energy problems were  raised in..-the  interview,  subjects were  able to answer 
a  general question which,  throws  som.e  light on  the matter. 1 
1  Eurobarometer  No  17,  June. 1982,  p.  ,1. - 10-
Question:  Here  are some  kinds of tears which  are sometimes expressed 
about the future  (say the next 10 or 15 years) of the world 
we  live in.  I  would like you to tell me  which of the 
following really concern you or worry you? 
More  and more artificial things are coming into 
the life ve lead (housing, traffic, food,  ate  •• ) 
'l'he  despoiling of natural life and the 
countryside by pollution of all kinds 
Increase in unemployment  as a  consequence of 
the automation of jobs 
Your  country's loss of infiuence in Europe 
A J!rolonsed breakdown in S!J!J!lies of oil 
and natural gas 
The  invasion of our country by'  low-priced 
products from  the  J'ar East 
A critical deterioration in international 
relations 
A rise in tensions between different groups in 
our society resulting in serious and lasting 
disorders 
A reduction in the infiuence of Western 
Europe in the world 
The  risk that the use of new medical or 
pharmaceutical discoveries may  severely affect 
the human  personality 
Rise in crime  and terrorism 
Beplies 
overall 
4$ 
5"' 
6$i 
14% 
1
2
"'  I 
20)6 
'"' 
Order of 
Erecedence 
4 
' 
2 
10 
G 
9 
6 
5 
11 
7 
1 
Thus  1  t  can be  seen that tear of a  prolonged breakdown in supplies of 
oU and natural gas features among  Europeans'  serious concerns tor the 
future. 
When  interviewed specifically on the extent of the energy crisis 
nearly two-thirds of the public considered it to be Tery serious or fairl7 
serious today;  similar proportions thought that it wul.d stUl be so 'in 
_ten years'  time. -II-
Questions:  Do  you think there is an energy problem in (your country)  today? 
If YES,  do  you think it is very serious, fairly serious or not 
very serious? 
And  in ten years'  time,  do  you  think there will be an energy 
problem in (your country)?  If YES,  do  you  think it will be 
very serious, fairly serious or not very serious? 
'l'o~az  In ten lears 
% 
Very serious  24)  30  ) 
)64  )  61 
Fairly serious  40)  31  ) 
Not very serious  15  12 
Bo  problem  15  11 
?  6  ...1£ 
100  100 
CONCERN  INDEX 1  2.78  2.95 
The  various_nationalities have very different ideas as to the gravity 
of the energy supply problem:  the Italians are by far the most aware of 
the problem,  followed by the J'rench.  Luxemburgers,  the British and,  above 
all, the  Dutch are the least concerned. 
Bearing in mind  the point that was made  in the first chapter, i.e. 
that Luxemburgers  and the  Dutch possess the greatest proportion of energy-
consuming appliances, whilst Italy is one of the least well-equipped 
countries, it is obvious that the fact that a  country is highly equipped 
does not necessarily mean  that its people exhibit a  correspondingly high 
level of concern about energy problems.  The  diagram on the following page 
illustrates national differences. 
1  To  simplify reading,  results have  been summarised in an index calculated 
as follows:  Very serious •  4,  fairly serious = 3,  not very serious •  2, 
no  problem =  1.  Bon-answers  have been excluded frCIIl  the calculation. 
The  index may  var,y theoretically from  one  to four,  the theoretical 
average being 2.  50. - 12-
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to average household energr 
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to  20  30  40  so  60  10  so  90  100 
l'ig.  2:  Assesl!llllent ot the gravi  t7 of the current energ problea 
What  is the picture within each individu&:l  countr;y?  Jk)es  c.ne's opinion 
ot the gravity of the crisis depend lipon whether one is a  high-level or a 
low-level conSUIIler?  !he answer is provided in the table below:  the higher 
the level of consum.ption,  the lower the degree ot concern  (according to the 
4efini,io.a en P•  4). 
The  energy problem 
toda;y is· ••• 
very serious 
fairly serious 
not very serious 
no  problan 
? 
OOICERI  DDEX 
Energ consumption level 
low  average  high 
"  "  "  26  ) 
)  67 
41  ) 
14 
11 
_! 
100 
2.88 
24) 
)64 
40) 
16 
16 
_J 
100 
2.75 
24) 
)64 
40) 
15 
18 
--1 
100 
2.71 
!he differences that can be observed here are not what one might expect. 
!hey refiect rather the absence ot 8117  rational pattern in opiDions on the 
crisis. - 13-
It is reasonable to wonder  whether  8!17  other factors affect this 
assessment of the energy crisis, e.g. age,  level of education,  degree  of' 
"cognitive mobilization".1  In fact,  none  of these factors appears to carry 
any weight in the answers  given,  since the gravity index is more  or less 
the same  in all the groups  studied.  There is one  exception,  however:  the 
-youngest  group,  particularly those who  are still receiving education,  are 
manifestly more  aware  of the crisis, which  indicates that the latter figures 
fairly prominently in current teaching programmes  (see table on  following 
page) • 
People  always  have  difficulty in making  forecasts;  1~  were  unable  to 
express an  opinion on  the question of energy supplies in ten years'  time. 
Those  who  were  able to do  so  tended to predict a worsening of the crisis 
(gravity index for today:  2.  78;  gravity index in ten years:  2.95). 
Tbe  feeling that things will get worse  prevails in most  countries; 
these  d~ not, however,  include the three countries which  are currentlr the 
most  concerned  (Italy, Prance,  Greece)  or Denmark,  where  the gravity index 
remains  stable or is slightly lower  than before. 
Luxembourg,  the United Kingdom,  .the letherlands and  Ireland are those 
countries where it is most  strongly felt that the situation will get worse. 
They  are also amongst  the least concerned today. 
1 The  "leadership" or "cognitive mobilization" index is produced b,y 
combining  the answers  to two  questions, one  on  frequency of political 
discussion,  the other on  the capacity to persuade others. 
In this poll, therefore,  the breakdown  of interviewees according to their 
degree of cognitive mobilization (or leadership) is as follows for the 
Community  as a whole: 
Non-leaders  Leaders  Total 
L- L- L+  L++ 
2~  34%  31%  12)6  100}6 
(n=2144)  (n=,,2,)  (n-30,6)  (n=1164)  (1=9667) 
For  further details on  how  the index is produced,  see  Annex  B-1. -14-
fable II - THE  GRAVITI  01 THE  ENERGY  CRISIS  (indices) 1 
today  In ten years.  Trend 
OVERALL  2.78  2.95  + .17 
AGE  :  l6:19 years  ~ 
~ 
+ .26 
24  "  2.78  +  .22 
~29"  2.78  + . 16 
3.0..3.9  "  2.78  2.98  + .20 
40-49  "  2.76  2.98  + .22 
5o-59.  "  2.76  2.87  +  •  11  6o·and  oYer  2.75  2.86  + •  11 
AGE  A.'l  WHICH  EOOCA!IO.tl  COMPLETED 
15  or under  2.79  2.93  + . 14 
16-19 year_s  2.61  2.91  + .30 
-~and over·  2.82  2.98  +  •  16 
still studying  [?:"9ZJ  (!J:?J  + .20 
LEADERSHIP  INDEX 
L++  2.83  2.89  + .05 
L+  2.79  2.98  +  •  19 
L- 2.76  2.96  + •  20 
L-- 2.74  2.94  + .20 
COUB!RY 
8  2.83  ~ 
+ .23 
DK  2.65  - .08 
D  2.68  2.87  + •  19 
F  2.94  2.91  - . 03 
IRL  2.67 
~ 
I+  •  39J 
I  ~~ 
= 
L 
~ 
NL  2.03  2.43 
UK  2.15  2.66 
GR  2.92  2.84 
1 See  p.11  for method of calculating index w1 th theoretical variation 
from  1  (no problan)  to 4  (very serious). 3,5 
3.0 
2.5 
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Pig. '1  Comparison of different countries'  gravity indices w1 th 
regard to the present crisis and  the situation in ten 
years'  time. - 16-
2.  POSSIBLE  SOLUTIOIS:  THE  PUBLIC'S  VIEW 
Europeans  have fairly clear ideas as  to what should be done  to solve 
the crisis. 
Question:  Different possibilities can be  thought of as solutions to the 
problem of  (your countey's)  energy supplies.  Which  solution do 
you  feel is most appropriate?  and  the next? 
- 'lo  buy or continue to buy from  abroad to 
make  up tor arrr  shortfall in energy 
supplies 
- ~  encourage  the research needed to solve 
the technical problems of, and put into 
prac'\;ice methods of producing renewable 
energy (solar power,  energy from 
biological sources, tidal power,  etc.) 
- To  develop or increase production of 
nuclear power 
- 'lo  increase or renew exploitation of 
energy from  traditional sources  (e.g. 
coal, lignite or brown  coal, peat) 
- To  save energy 
- ? 
The  most appropriate solution 
lirst  Second  TOTAL 
"  "  % 
6 
51 
10 
15 
14 
5 
19 
29 
26 
8  -
100  100 
11 
70 
23 
44 
40 
These  results are remarkable tor a  number  of reasons: 
(a)  'l'he  desire for national independence as regards energy is indirectly 
expressed in the extremely low  percentage in favour of buying energy 
from  abroad,  despite the fact that is actually what is happening in 
a  great man7  countries now. 
(b)  Public opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of increasing the use of 
renewable  energy sources:  one  in two  Europeans  considers this to be 
the most appropriate solution, whereas  none  of_!Jle other options gains 
anything like this level of support.  This is not the first time that -17-
the attraction of new  energy sources has been demonstrated.  In a 
European  survey,  conducted in 1979,  concerning scientific research and 
its most desirable orientation,  the public had  to select from  a list of 
eight research areas,  those that they considered to be  worthwhile.  The 
most popular choice  (8~) was  that of developing medical and  surgical 
research on  human  organ transplants, followed b7  spending, "it 
necessary,  a  great deal of money  to find and  develop  new  sources of 
energy•  (7~); the remaining six suggestions gained tar less support.1 
(c)  Increasing or renewing exploitation of energy from  traditional sources 
seems  to be regarded as a  back-up measure:  this option is a  tairlyo 
common  choice, but usually in second place. 
(d)  Energy-savings feature fairly low  down  in the order of preference; in 
common  with traditional sources,  they are regarded as a  supplementary 
solution. 
(e)  Lastly, increased production of nuclear energy is regarded as being 
desirable or acceptable by one  in tour Europeans.  Attitudes to the 
nuclear option will be discussed at length in the following chapters. 
It is even more  instructive to study together the first and  second 
choices made  b7  each of the ten thousand people interviewed.  Of  the twenty 
possible combinations,  the most  popular were  the following: 
Percentage 
1st SOLUTIOI  and  2nd  SOLUTIOI  choosing 
combination 
1.  Renewable  energy sources  Traditional sources  21% 
2.  "  "  "  Energy-savings  11}6 
'·  "  "  "  Nuclear energy  9}6 
4·  Traditional sources  Renewable  energy sources  6,!6 
5.  "  "  Energy-savings  8}6 
6.  Energy-savings  Renewable  energy sources  8}6 
1 See  Annex  B-2. -18-
It is worth noting that tbe third most freqaent combination is the 
development of nuclear power  and research into renewable energy sources. 
Generally,  those who  put renewable energy sources in first place tended to 
choose nuclear power  as the  second  solution and,  above all, those whose 
first choice vas nuclear energy more  often than not put renewable energy 
sources in second place. 
A fairly substantial number  of Europeans  do  not therefore regard 
these two  solutions as being mutually exclusive. 
-- - ..  -·  -··. -·  ·-.  ...  ---- -- -- ··--·· 
FIRST  CHOICE 
~total no.  of  Purchas·  Renew.  Nuclear  Exploit.  Energy- Don't 
interviewees  ~Afi 
energy  power·  trad.  savings  know 
2nd  f>urch·s~ 
3  abroad  - - 1  1  -
c 
B  Bene:w.  2  5  6  6  - - 0  energy 
I 
Nuclear  c  1  9  - 1  1  1 
E  power· 
Trad. 
1  21  3  4  - - sources-
lmergy--.  1  17  2  6  - - savings 
Don't 
1  1  1  2  3  know  -
TOTAL  6  51  10  15  14  4 
TOTf-L 
5 
19 
13 
29 
26 
8 
100 
!be general tendencies described above  reflect a  reasonablJ vide 
consensus  throughout the ten Member  States, vi  th one or tvo variations such 
as the  stroilg attachment to traditional sources in Ireland, the Uoited 
Kingdom  and  Belgium,  and the relatively high level of interest in the nuclear 
option in Oe:nn&Jl7,  Prance  and Italy.  However,  public opinion through the 
(bnmunity is very largely in favour of developing renewable energy sources 
(see graph on following page) • RENEWABLE  ENERGY 
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J'.lg.  4:  The  most appropriate solutions to problems of energy- supply 
(breakdown by country) 
(Percentages having selected each solution as a first or 
second choice) -20-
Most of the suggested solutions tor coping vi  th future energy 
requirements are controTersial.  Some  ot them  have  giTen rise to  the 
formation ot pressure groups tor or against.  Bov  tar is it possible to 
discern dirleions vi  thin the various social-demographic groups? 
'lhe  effect ot age is particularly interesting, giTen that most ot the 
solutions offered presuppose long periods of inTestment,  taking effect only 
·in the long term.  'What  is remarkable  is that, with few  exceptions, all age 
/ 
groups expressed the same  preferences.  Elderly people tended to be 
somewhat  more  in faTour of rerlrlng traditional energy sources, whereas  the 
youngest group was  rather more  attracted by the deTelopment ot renewable 
energy sources,  showing  slightly greater understanding of energy-eaTings. 
The  nuclear option receiTed much  the same  vote all round. 
-CD Renewable  energy sources 
Traditional sources 
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Pig.  5:  The  most appropriate solutions to problems ot energy sUpPly 
(breakdown by age) 
(Percentages haTing selected each solution as a  first or 
second choice) {3) 
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A comparative  study of other groupings, tor example,  by level of 
education, or degree of "leadership",  confirms  same  predictable results: 
those who  have  received more  education and "leaders" tend to be slightly 
more  in favour than others of renewable energy sources and the nuclear 
option;  those with the lowest education level, who  are also the oldest,  are 
the most in favour of a  return to traditional energy sources.  However,  in 
this case too, the basic order remains unchanged. 
- 0  -
'lhus, when it comes  to expressing an opinion on  the range of possible 
solutions, one  European in four is in favour of developing or increasing 
the production of nuclear power. 1  . 
1 It is worth recalling that twice in the past the principle of developing 
or increasing nuclear power  has been put to the public in the more 
general context of important socio-political questions such as national 
defence,  reducing the poverty gap,  the fight against terrorism, state 
intervention in the  econ.o1n7,  aid to the 'fhird W:>rld,  etc.  In this 
context it emerges  that not only are about a  quarter positively in 
favour of developing nuclear power,  but also a  substantial proportion 
claim to be "more  or less in favour". 
Question:  I  should like to have your opinion on a  number  of important 
issues.  'fell me  how  far you  agree or disagree vi  th each of 
the following statements. 
There  followed a list including:  Buclear power  should be 
developed or increased to meet future energy needs. 
April  1979  October  1981 
Agree  ent1re!7  20  24 
Tend  to agree  '2  '4  Tend  to disagree  17  16 
Disagree entirely  18  15 
?  1'  11  - 100  100 -22-
III.  IBJ'OBMA'liOB 
!he reader will have  to judge for himself  1  on the basis of the data 
contained in this study  1  whether or not there is a  case for investing 
greater effort in our energy information policies. 
Is the public sufficiently exposed to the gravity of supply 
problems? 
It is realistic enough in its choice of solutions? 
Does it receive adequate motivation from energy-saving campaigns? 
Anyone  specializing in opinion polls will be aware of the fact that, 
whilst the expression "energy crisis" undoubtedly evokes a  response in 
the general public  1  it  may not actually convey anything very precise.  One 
thing is certain:  consumers in the high-level bracket,  be  they countries 
or individuals,  tend to play down  the scale of supply problems,  as if' the 
possibility of a  crisis had nothing to do  with their own  consumption. 
It is difficult to know  how  to approach an information policy in 
this field.  we  are going to look first at whether or not the public 
envisages  a  role tor the European  Cormnuni ty as regards energy policy  1  and 
secondly at its response to the media's handling of the problem. -23-
1.  THE  ROLE  Ol THE  EUROPEAI  COMMUBITI 
As  a  rule, when it comes  to the quest~on  of research expansion and of the 
protection of the environment,  the  general public tends to feel that it 
is, above  all, the responsibility of national governments  to lay down. 
guidelines and to make  the rules and regulations.  Be search into new 
sources of energy and the safety of nuclear power  stations are no 
exception to this rule.  :tJevertheless, it must be said that a  quarter of 
those interviewed give prominence  to the responsibility of the European 
Community. 
Qaestion:  Who  do  you  think should have  responsibility for regulating the 
following problems? 
IDeal  lational  The  European 
authorities  governments  Community 
lature conservation  43  48  23 
Air pollution  28  57  21 
Water pollution  35  50  29 
Nuclear plant safety  17  ~  26 
Protection of endangered species  26  56  29 
Siting of industrial development  38  49  17 
Research for new  types of energy  17  ~  28 
NB.  Borisontal percentages.  Several answers possible. 
Whilst it is clear from.  the above  figures that, 1n  the public's view, 
the govermtent should take prime responsibility for research into new 
energy sources  (and for nuclear plant safety), it would  be wrong  to assume 
that it is expected to do  so  independent.ly of other European countries. 
In  fact,  the answers to a  set of questions asked imMediately after the 
first oil crises (November  1974  and  .April  1975)  showed  quite clearly that, 
at the time,  the achievement of a  common  energy policy vas considered to 
be important or very important by three-quarters of the public in the 
nine European  Canmun1 ty countries, and that, as far as energy policy was -24-
concerned,  independent action 'bJ'· each countey vas far less desirable than 
concerted action by the Conmunity as a  whole  (in Bovanber  1974: 
independent action:  1~, concerted action:  74%;  April  1975:  independent 
action:  1~, co.acertad action:  70%).1 
Coming  back to 1982,  the countries most villing to accord to the 
Ju.ropean  Community  the responsibilit)" for research into new  aneru sources 
vera Luxembourg  ( 6o}6) 1  the Betherlands  (51%) 1  Belgium  ( 47%)  and  Jrance 
(~); the other countries were far more  reluctant:  Ireland  (f~J'),  Italy-
( 11%),  Greece  ( 19%) 1  the  Un1 ted lingd0111  ( ~  1  Garma!J7  ( 2f~J')  and Deraark 
(~).  The  positions taken on the responsibility for nuclear plant 
safety form much  the  s&llle  pattern. 
1'be  attitudes of individual laropeans stem partly from  their SJIDPathy' 
towards  the  Common  Market.  'Dle  extent to which they do  so, however,  is 
relatively limited, which  suggests that the Community  has failed to 
impress upon the public the importance that it attaches to· joint action in 
this field. 
50%. 
40 
30 
20 
1  0 
The  Community  should take the responsibility t.or: 
G)  research into new  anergy sources 
®  power plant safet7 
Index of conani tment 
1----1----t-----1----~  to the EC  * 
\'lEAl(  1  2  3  5  S'lBOBG 
* The  index of CODIIlitmant  to the Community  is calculated on the basis ot 
the combined  answers  to two  questions:  •aenerall.7 speaking,  do  you  think 
that (your countey' s) membership of the Common  Market is a  good  thing,  a 
bad thing, or neither good nor bad?•  and •u you were  told tomorrow that 
the Bo.ropean  Community  (Common  Market)  had been scrapped would you  be 
very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?•  See  Annex  B-4 on this 
index. 
It thus appears that far more  should be done  to mobilise staunch 
Sllpporters ot the  European Community vi  tb regard to joint action on eneru 
and nuclear safety matters. 
1Sources:  Burobarometer Ro  2, Bovember  1974:  Eurobarometer lo 31  April  1975 -25-
2.  ASS~T  OJ'  MEDIA  PERJ'ORMANCE 
Question:  I  am  going to mention different wqs in which  we  get information 
about energy problems in general.  J'or  each one,  can you tell me 
whether in your opinion they keep people like yourself well-
intonned,  badly-informed or give no  information on energy 
problems? 
Well  Badly  Bot at all  Ibn1t  Know 
Daily newspapers  43  36  6  15  100 
Periodicals and magazines  31  32  10  zr  100 
Radio  38  36  8  18  100 
Television  52  33  5  10  100 
Schools and  universities  22  20  12  46  100 
Overall,  the public would  appear to take a  rather dim view of the 
media as a  source of information on energy problems,  although more  than 
halt consider that television informs them well. 
It must be said, though,  that answers to this question merely refiect 
the public's general attitudes towards  the various media.  In tact, a more 
or less identical question put to Europeans  in 1976 in a  completely 
different context (consumer information) produced very similar results.  1 
It follows,  therefore, that the answers  given on this occasion were  not 
specifically concerned with the energy question. 
1 Question asked in 1976:  "Do  you  think that the following information 
media provide good,  poor or no  information at all tor consumers?" 
Provide:  Don't 
Good  Poor  No  lmow/ 
information  information  intonnation no replyTotal 
Daily.· newspapers 
Magazines  and periodicals 
Radio 
Television 
17 
16 
15 
12 
15 
25 
18 
12 
Source:  "European Consumers",  Commission  of the European  Communities, 
1976,  P•  72. 
100 
100 
100 
100 -26-
1'he  final item (schools and uni  Yersi  ties) calls for special analTSis 
ot the ansvers giYen by. those tllOre  full7 uposed to this source of 
into:rmation:  those who  baTe  receiYed some  form  of' further education (to 
age  al and oYer)  and those still being educated. 
The  intol'll&tion provided by schools and 
universities is 
Good  Bad  Ron- D:ln1t  Total 
existent  know 
ot those who  completed their 
education at age  20  or over  ZT  26  16  31  100 
or young  people still 
6  receiving education  40  '5  19  100 
Thus  students are far more  likel;y than the public in general to take 
the view that schools and universities do provide intormation on energ;y 
aatters and that they do  so rather well.  Is this level of'  intonnation 
refiected in their answers to questions on important issues? 
'!he  energy crisis toda;y is 
very serious 
fairly serious 
In ten ;years'  time, it will be 
very serious 
f'airl;y serious 
!be most appropriate solutions: 
(1st and  2nd  repl;y) 
- to bu;y from abroad 
- renewable energy sources 
- the nuclear option 
- traditional energy sources 
- energy-savings 
Students 
13 
77 
24 
''  47 
Others 
aged 
15-24 
19  )  64 
45  ) 
'2) 62 
30  ) 
10 
70 
20 
41 
47 
General 
public 
24)64 
40) 
30) 
31  )  61 
11 
70 
23 
44 
40 
Students can thus be seen to be far more  aware  of'  the energy crisis 
than others.  1he determining factor here is education rather than age: 
others in the same  age  group who  are no longer being educated ahov leas 
awareness. -27-
When  it comes  to choosing appropriate solutions, however,  education 
plays a  far less obvious part. 
Students are clearly less drawn  to traditional energy sources, but 
are more  attracted to the exploitation of renewable  sources than their 
contemporaries who  are no  longer being educated. 
This  shows  that the education provided does not contain sutt1c1entl7 
realistic information as to the limitations of renewable  sources in 
relation to overall needs.  With  regard to the nuclear option, whilst they 
are slightly more  in favour of it than their contemporaries,  students do 
not appear to have  been given very convincing information on  the subject. 
- 0  -PART  !WO:  T  B  E  N U C L  E  A ll  0  P  T  I  0  B 
OPINIONS  AID  PRECONCEPTIONS -29-
In Part Two  or this report, all the questions we  will discuss mention 
nuclear power  stations specifically, whereas  those anal,-sed in Part One 
referred to the more  abstract concept of nuclear energy. 
Before  embarking on  the surve7 of the EUropean  public's attitudes to 
nuclear power  stations, it is worth stressing two  important factors: 
- first, the degree of involvement of the ten Community  Member  States in 
the operation or construction of nuclear power  stations varies widely. 
Scrutiny of the map  on p. 32 illustrating nuclear power  stations in 
service, under construction or at the planning stage makes it possible 
to distinguish between three groups of Man.ber  States: 
- those in which nuclear power  is developed on  a  large scale: 
France,  the Federal Republic of Gennany, 
United Kingdom  and  Belgium; 
- those in which nuclear power is developed on a  small scale: 
the Netherlands and  Ital,-; 
- those in which nuclear power  is not developed at all: 
Luxembourg,  Denmark,  Ireland and  Greece; 
- secondly,  the proportion of inhabitants living close to a  nuclear power 
station (in service or planned)  varies greatly from one  country to 
another.  Purthermore,  nuclear power  stations can even be sited close to 
the populations of countries that have  no  nuclear programme:  tor example, 
all the inhabitants of Luxembourg  live less than 6o miles awq from 
French nuclear power  stations;  on  the other hand,  ms.ny  Frenchmen  have  no 
nuclear power  station in the area where  the7 live. 
It therefore appeared worthwhile to measure  the  "psychological" 
distance and the actual distance between the people questioned and  the 
nearest nuclear plant. 
Question:  Ib you  know it in the area where  y.ou  live there is a  nuclear 
power  station, actually working,  or one  being built, or one in 
the planning stages? 
IES - actually working 
- one  being built 
- one in the planning 
stages 
10  -none 
Ibn't know 
1'1%  ) 
) 
796) 
)  24% 
) 
~) -30-
Question:  How  far away  from  your home  is this actual or planned nuclear 
power  station? 
Less than 6 miles  ~) 
)  1$ 
7-30 miles  10J'  ) 
31  to 6o miles  9}6 
6o  o:r  more  ~ 
2496 
By  way  of a  check,  the interviewer vas instructed to note whether the 
place where  the interview was  held was  situated more  or less than 6o miles 
from  the closest nuclear station.  It is apparent from  a  comparison of the 
two  sources that certain interviewees living more  than  6o  miles away  from 
a  nuclear power  station tended to underestimate the distance.  Nevertheless, 
the interviewees'  estimates generally correspond fairly closely to the 
actual distances. -31-
Table m  - THE  NUCLEAR  GFDGRAPBI  OF  'lHE  EUBOPEAHS 
Manber  State  Scale on which  Percentage of the  Percentage of tbe 
inhabitants who  state  inhabitants who 
nuclear power  that there is a  nuclear  state that the 
power station being  power  station is: 
is deTeloped  built or in the planning 
stages •close• to the  less than  '1 to 60 
place where  the7 lift  ,a miles  ndles 
" 
aV!l 
;6 
&V&l 
96 
P'B.ANCE  large  '' 
16  12 
P'EDRRAL 
REPUBLIC  OF 
GERMANY  II  2'  16  14 
UNITED  KINGOOM  II  14  9  '  BELGIUM  •  ,a  21  1 
NETBERLANIE  small  19  15  '  ITALY  "  18  7  6 
LUXJ!MB>URG  non-existent  64  4'  20 
DENMARK  II  II  14  11  2 
IRELAND  II  II  4 
GREECE  II  II  1 
EEC  TOTAL  12  8 -32-
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~~~========~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--------
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I.  THE  BASIC  OPTION:  FOR  OR  AGAINST  'l'BE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  NUCLEAR  POWER 
Question:  All new  development in the industrial field implies effort, time 
and money;  it  111Q'  also involve risk.  Here  are three opinions 
about the development ot nuclear power stations  1  which use 
atomic energy tor the production ot electricity. 
~ch  ot these three statements comes  closest to ,our own  opinion 
on the development ot nuclear power? 
It is worthwhile  '8}6 
No  particular interest  10}6 
The  risks involved are unacceptable  '~ 
1bn1t  know  ~ 
100}6 
In its brutal simplicity, this question forces the person interviewed 
to state his position on  the development ot nuclear power.  Later on in the 
interview  1  the person will have  the opportunity to clarity his opinions  1 
attitudes and anxieties; here, he  has to show  his colours. 
Now  it is apparent that in the adult population ot the Coumunity,  i.e. 
some  200 million people  1  there are two  contradictoey trends which  are almost 
exactly' matched in number,  each having nearly 75 million supporters.  Neither 
should it go  unnoticed that 1"' of Europeans were  unable or umdlling to 
answer  the  question, while  10}6  stated that nuclear power  stations were  ot no 
interest. 
With  reg~  to what vas presented in Part One  of this report,  two 
remarks  should be made. 
( 1)  More  people state here that they are in favour of the development of 
nuclear power  ('8}6)  than those who  chose nuclear power  as a more 
appropriate solution than others to the energy crisis ( 2'*) • 
( 2)  The  former  are  1  on the other hand,  fewer in number  than the total of 
those who,  during the opinion polls carried out in April  1979  and 
October  1981,  declared that they agreed entirely (24%  in 1981)  or to 
a  certain extent  ('4%)  with the statement:  "Nuclear energy should -34-
be developed in order to satisfy future energy needs"  (seep. 21). 
Each  of these different questions  and  statistics throws its own  light 
on the subject.  Undoubtedl71  the question we  are anal7sing here offers the 
advantage of placing each interviewee in a situation of conflict between 
tbe benefits of nuclear electricit7 production and its possible risks; it 
also transcends the abstract concept of nuclear energy and  mentions directly 
the concrete existence of nuclear power  stations.  It is in this sense that 
the choice it reveals is of particular interest. 
The  tvo extreme views  defined b.Y  the question are upheld b.r different 
sections of public opinion. 
The  favourable view ("it is worthwhile")  is prevalent amongst males, 
citisens aged  40  or over,  higher-income  groups  and those who  have  pursued 
their education beyond  the school-leaving age. 
The  negative attitude ("the risks involved are unacceptable") is most 
corrmon  amongst  females,  the young,  those who  have  the lowest educational 
level and  lower-income  groups. 
Nevertheless,  the tvo main features of the basic option are that it is 
both national and :political.  1  To  be  still more  precise  1  we  can sq that 
the favourable opinion varies mainl7 according to the country concerned, 
while  the negative viewpoint varies above  all according to political 
preferences  1  which  are gauged  here on  the basis of the interviewee  1 s  own 
definition of his position on  the left-right scale.2 
1Tb1s  assertion· is made  in the light of the Pearson's coefficients  ~ 
(standard deviation .;.  average x  100) 1  which  are as followsz 
Positive o;etion  v 
b7 age  82 
b7 position on  the 
left-right scale  267 
b7 countr,y  rn2J 
Nesative o;etion 
b7 age 
b.1  position on the 
left-right scale 
b7 countey 
v 
149 
I  '
40 I 
194 
2see on p. 401  footnote  11  how  poll  tical preferences are recorded with the 
aid of a left-right scale. -35-
ATTI'rUll!S  ACCORDING  TO  THE  MJ!MBER  S!A'I'E  OONCEBNED 
In 1982,  a  dominant trend in favour of the development of nuclear 
power prevailed in three Member  States:  France,  the Federal Republic of 
Germany  and the  United Kingdom.  In all the other Member  States, the 
prevailing trend was  anti-nuclear.  Clearly, attitudes are at least partly 
connected with the scale on which nuclear power is developed in·the countr,y 
concerned. 
Table  IV  - THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  NUCLEAR  POWER 
No 
rk>rth- particular  Unacceptable  Don't  TO!AL 
while  interest  risks  know 
I 
)  P'RABCE  51  4  ,o  15  100 
) 
)  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC 
large  )  OF  GERMANY  '7  14  Z1  22  100 
ell 
) 
H  )  UNITED  IINGIX»!  '9  17  '7  7  100 
I 
) 
[ill  )  BELGIUM  Z1  9  27  100 
! 
)  NETBERLANlB  '4  6  [:J 
12  100 
small  ) 
)  ITALY  '4  5  19  100 
1::)  2 
:z; 
e 
)  LlJIEMil)URG  '2  8  49  11  100 
i 
) 
non- )  Dl!liKABK  25  9  50  16  100 
~ existent ) 
)  IRELAND  1'  21  47  19  100 
~ 
) 
)  GREECE  15  6  49  ~  100 
ell 
The  countries in which nuclear power is developed on the largest scale 
are also those in which public opinion is most favourable  and the topic 
gives rise to the least anxiety.  The  countries that do  not have  any nuclear 
plant are by far those in which anxiety is greatest.  Should this be seen 
as the result of information and familiarization, which gradually reconciles 
public opinion with nuclear energy? -36-
aat how do  opinions va;q w1 th time?  Fortunately', we  have statistics 
dating back to 1978.  At  that time,  the same  question, which was  cast in 
the sme terms, 1 Jielded results for the Community  as a  whole  that were 
very similar to the current situation. 
TRENm  1978-82 
44%  38% 
NO  PARTICULAR  INTEREST 
lX>I' T  KNOW 
UNACCEPTABLE  RISKS 
OC1'0BER  1978  APRIL  1982 
Fig. 7a  The  development of nuclear power 
lfevertheless, this apparent stability of Community  opinion conceals 
major changes  along different lines in the various Member  States. 
In Prance,  the Pederal Republic of Oerm8D7  and the letherlands  1 
]lll.'blio  opinion ha• 'become  more  tavourablez  the number  ot those taking 
the view that the developnent of nuclear power  "is worthwhile• has 
increased, while the number  of those who  consider that the risks involved 
are unacceptable has declined. 
1Source:  "!he European public's attitudes towards scientific and 
technical development",  European Communities,  1979. (4) 
-37-
In Belgium,  public opinion has remained virtuall.7 identical. 
In the other countries,  the trend is unfavourable,  since interest in 
the issue has decreased and anxieties are on  the increase:  this is the 
case in the Un1 ted Kingdom  in particular  1  whose  nuclear capacity is 
nevertheless large and long-established. 
Close scrutiny of fable  V throws interesting light on each Member 
State.  ll'or  example  1  the main change in Luxembourg  since  1978  has been 
increased anxiety; in Ireland, the most important change is the 
considerable drop in the interest aroused b,y  the development of nuclear 
power  1  while in the Federal Republic or Germany  1  the main variation has 
been the alleviation or anxiety.  In Prance  I  the trend is favourable on 
both counts  1  and  that country- is now  at the top of the league table of all 
the Community  Member  States with an absolute majority (51%)  of positive 
replies. 
The  graph on p. '9 (Pig.  8) illustrates the shifts in opinion 
between  1978  and  1982. -38-
Table V - THE  DEVELOPMJ!ET  OF  NUCLEAR  POWER 
(trends in attitudes between October  1978  and  April  1982) 
l«>RTHWHILE  UNACCEPTABLE  RISKS 
~ 
19~2  Variation  ·~  19~2  Variation 
%  % 
P'RABCE  40  51  +  11  42  ~1  - 11 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC 
OF  GERMANY  ~5  ~7  +  2  45  ~0  - 15 
NETHER.LANm  26  34  +  6  54  48  - 6 
BELGIUM  29  - 2  ~9  37  - 2 
LUIEMOOURO  ~5  ~2  - ' 
~1  49  +  18 
DENMARK  ~7  25  - 12  ~4  49  +  15 
UNITED  KINGIXM  57  ~9  - 18  25  ~7  +  12 
ITALY  53  ~4  - 19  29  4~  +  14 
IRELAND  43  13  - 32  ~5  47  +  12 
GREECE  question  15  question  50 
not asked  not asked 
EC  ~8  ~7 Less replies that 
it is Worthwhile 
-39-
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Fig.  8:  Trends in public opinion on  the development  of nuclear 
power  between  October 1978  and  April 1982. 
An  example of how  to read the graph:  in all the countries appearing in the 
upper right-hand quadrant,  public acceptance of nuclear energy has improved; 
for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany,  fear of'  nuclear hazards 
has decreased by  1  ~' while belief in the  economic  value of'  nuclear energy 
has varied little. 
In all the countries that appear in the blottom  left-hand quadrant, public 
acceptance has declined.  For example,  in Ireland,  '~less than in 1978 
believe that "it is worthwhile"  and  11%  more  take the view that the risks 
involved are unacceptable. :;;;.: 
-40-
AftiTUDES  ACCORDING  TO  POSI!ION  01 THE  LEP'l'-RIGHT  POLITICAL  SCALE 1 
Lea'ring the national context aside, it is indisputably the Europeans  1 
tendency to locate themselves towards the left or the right of the political 
spectrum that is the factor which  can be  most closely correlated to their 
attitude towards the development of nuclear power. 
Extreme 
left  Lett  Centre  Bight 
The  development  Positions  Positions  Positions  Positions 
ot nuclear power:  .1  and  2  ~and j  ~and &  1 and 6 
- worthwhile  25  32  40  [ill 
- no  particular 
interest  7  6  10  9 
- unacceptable risks  [jQ]  Ifli  34  25 
-don't know 
!OTJL 
6  13  16  14 
100  100  100  100 
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Fig. 9:  .Attitudes towards the developnent of nuclear power  according to 
the interviewee.•s declared position on the lett-right scale 
1  . 
Dlring the European surveys  1  each person interviewed was  requested to locate 
himself on a  lett-right political scale ranging from  1 (Lett) to 10  (Bight). 
we  thus have  a  homogeneous  classitication of the interviewees tbat enables 
comparisons to be drawn between countries, which would  be virtuall7 
impossible to obtain if  we  had to use as a  basis preferences for the national 
political parties. -41-
ATTITUDES  ACCORDING  TO  AGE  AND  EDUCATIONAL  LEVEL 
Below  the  age  of  forty,  those  interviewed expressed more  often their 
anxiety  about  the hazards  than  their interest  in the  advantages  of develop-
ing nuclear power.  Above  that age,  they  tend  to be  in  favour  of  the  bene-
fits but  - le~ it be  repeated  ~  the variations  observed  according  to  age 
are much  smaller  than  those.  on  the basis of political opinion  that we  have 
already described. 
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Fig.  10:  Attitudes  towards  the  development  of nuclear power  according 
to  age. 
Nevertheless,  it is well-known  that  the  young  are  on  the  whole  more  left-
wing  than  their elders;  however,  they  also have  a  higher standard of edu-
cation,  and  the effect  of  the latter is  marked:  the higher  the  education 
level,  the  greater is  the  feeling  that  the  development  of nuclear power  is 
promising, 
Educational  level: 
Low 
Average 
High 
The  development  of nuclear  power  stations: 
Worthwhile  No  particular  Unaccept- Don't 
34 
41 
49 
interest  able  risks  know 
11 
10 
5 
34 
37 
38 
21 
12 
8 
Total 
100 
100 
100 -42-
THE  EFFECT  OF  ANXIETY  ABOUT  FUTURE  ENERGY  SUPPLIES 
·Paradoxically,  there  is no  obvious  link between  the belief that  there will 
be  a  serious  energy crisis in ten years'  time  and  the  support  given  to  the 
development  of nuclear power.  The  attitudes  adopted  by  the  public  do  not 
appear  to be  based  on  any  consideration of economic  expediency. 
Among  those  who  think 
that in ten years'  time 
the  energy crisis will 
be: 
Very  serious 
Fairly serious 
Not  very  serious 
The  development  of nuclear power stations: 
Worthwhile 
38 
41 
39 
No  particular 
interest 
9 
9 
12 
Unaccept-
able  risks 
42 
35 
35 
Don't 
know 
11 
15 
14 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
Nevertheless,  as  we  will see  later,  those who  have  opted here  in  favour  of 
developing nuclear power,  rather than rejecting it on  the  grounds  that  the 
risks  are unacceptable,  tend  to rationalise their choice  by  finding 
a  posteriori economic  advantages  in electricity of nuclear origin. 
THE  EFFECT  OF  LIVING  IN  THE  VICINITY  OF  A NUCLEAR  POWER  STATION 
It was  mentioned  above  that  a  distinction was  drawn  among  the  interviewees 
between  those  living in  the vicinity of  (at a  distance  of  30  miles  or less 
from)  a  nuclear  power station in service,  under  construction or at  the 
planning stage:  12%  stated that  they belonged  to this  category.  The  opinion 
of  this specific sector of public  opinion  does  not  differ substantially 
from  that of the public at  large.  If,  on  the other hand,  the  replies given 
by  those  living close-to a  nuclear power  station in service  are  compared 
with  those  given by  people  living in the vicinity of  a  planned nuclear 
station,  it is apparent  that  the  initial stage  (the planning of  the  station) 
is  above  all  a  source  of anxiety,  whereas  the  following  stages -43-
(construction  and  operation)  bring about  a  positive  change  in attitudes.1 
OVERALL  (reminder) 
Those  living less  than 
60  miles  from  a  nuclear 
power  station: 
- in the  planning stage 
- being built 
- actually working 
Those  living less  than 
30  miles  from  a  nuclear 
power  station in the 
planning stages,  being 
built or actually 
workingl 
The  development  of nuclear 
Worthwhile 
38 
39 
46 
45 
41 
No  particular 
interest 
10 
7 
10 
5 
7 
power  stations: 
Unaccept-
able risks 
37 
41 
33 
39 
39 
Don't 
know 
15 
13 
11 
13 
13 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
NB:  In view of  the  limited number  of cases,  the  above  figures  cannot  be 
broken  down. 
THE  IMPACT  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  MOVEMENTS2 
There  are  anti-nuclear movements  in the Member  States:  what  is their 
audience  and  their impact  on  the  attitudes of  the  general public  towards 
the  option  of  developing  nuclear power? 
On  the whole,  nearly half  the  Connnunity  citizens  interviewed  (46%)  state 
that  they  approve  of  these movements,  while  on  the  other hand  a  substantial 
number  (39%)  disapprove  of  them. 
1 
2 
See  the  similar results obtained  on  this  topic  in the  United States  in a 
series  of  surveys  carried out  in  1975  and  1976  by  the  Institute Louis 
Harris,  which  compared  after an  interval of one year  the attitudes of 
people  living near nuclear power  stations with  those  of  the  public at 
large  towards  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of nuclear power.  Battelle, 
Human  Affairs  Research  Center:  Nuclear power  and  the  public  (Analysis 
of collected surveys  research),  November  1977. 
This  section was  prepared  thanks  to the kind  cooperation of Mr  Nicholas 
Watts,  In-ternationales  Institut  fU.r  Umwelt  und  Gesellschaft  (Berlin), 
who  included  in  the  same  survey  four questions  on  various  protest move-
ments  has  has  allowed  us  to  use  the  findings. -44-
Question:  There  are movements  and  organizations that endeavour  to enlist 
public support for their campaigns  against the construction or 
extension of nuclear power  stations,  Can  you  tell me  whether 
you  approve  of them  (whole-heartedly  or moderately)  or whether 
you  disapprove of them  (moderately  or whole-heartedly)? 
Approve  whole-heartedly  24% 
) 
)  46% 
"  moderatelv  22%  ) 
Disapprove moderately  21% 
) 
)  39% 
"  whole-heartedly  18%  ) 
Don't  know  15%  -
100% 
Index of support  1  2.61 
The  index obtained here,  2.61,  is much  lower  than those  obtained  in  favour 
of  the  movements  for  the protection of nature  (3.53),  the ecologist move-
ments  (3.04)  and  the  peace movements  (3.02)  respectively. 
The  index of support  for  the  anti-nuclear movements  varies  considerably 
from  one  country  to another, 
// 
Index of support  for  the  anti-nuclear 
movements 
1 
Belgium 
Federal  Republic  of Germany 
France 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Greece 
COMMUNITY 
2.31 
2.37 
2.43 
2.55 
2.61 
2.74 
2.84 
2.90 
3.18 
3.50 
2.61 
The  index of  support  is  calculated by  assigning  a  coefficient  of  4  to  the 
answers  "I approve whole-heartedly",  and  so  on  down  to  a  coefficient  of  1 
to  the  answers "I disapprove whole-heartedly".  It can  therefore vary 
between  1  and  4. -45-
A glance  at this Table  suggests  that  there is little public support  for  the 
anti-nuclear movements  in countries  in which  nuclear power  is highly-developed, 
while  such  support  reaches  a  peak  in countries  that have  not  developed 
nuclear power  at all. 
The  following  graph  (Fig.  11)  highlights  the  link that exists between  the 
index of support  for  the anti-nuclear movements  and  the  personal  feeling 
expressed by  the  public that the  development  of nuclear power  involves  un-
acceptable  risks.  This  link is  a  strong one. 
~ stating that the developnent 
of nuclear power  involves 
una oeptable risks 
50 
ONL 
40 
/ 
eoK 
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Fig.  11:  Link  between  the  index of support  for  the  anti-.nuclear movements 
and  the  percentage of the public who  state that  the  development 
of nuclear power  involves unacceptable  risks, -%-
Scrutiny of  the  position of  the  various Member  States with  respect to the 
'  1'  l  b  '  1  h  f  h  '  f  M  b  S  . regress1on ·  1ne  r1ngs  out  c  earer t  e  act  t  at  1n  our  em  er  tates. 
personal. fears  of  the  risks  that  the  development  of nuclear  power  might 
involve  are  proportional  to  the  support  expressed  for  the  anti-nuclear 
protest movements:  Belgium.  the United Kingdom,  Italy and  Ireland belong  to 
this  category. 
In France and  the Federal  Republic  of Germany,  approval  of  the  anti-nuclear 
movements  - which  is, moreover,  relatively  limited  - reveals  a  tendency  to 
protest  in principle rather  than a  real  fear;  in Denmark,  Luxembourg  and  the 
Netherlands  on  the other hand,  strong  feelings  of fear  are  associated with 
less  approval  than expected  for  the  protest movements. 
1  It should be  borne  in mind  that  the  regression  line was  calculated on 
the basis  of  the attitudes of all the  Ten. -47-
II.  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  THE  STAKES 
When  faced with  advanced  technological  and  industrial  devE!lopments,  public 
opinion is more  or. less  consciously  subjected  to contradictory pressures: 
going  ahead _with  development  involves  risks,  but  there may  also be  a  ]:'isk 
in not  doing  so. 
Question:  Some  say  that if  we  don't continue  to develop  nuclear  power~ 
we  shaU  soon  have  to cut dovm  on  electrioity consumption,  Do 
you  think that this is- true or not? 
True 
Not  true 
Don't know 
46% 
31% 
23% 
100% 
And  supposing it were  true~  do  you  think this would be  a  very 
serious  situation~  somewhat  serious~ not so  serious~  or not at 
aU serious? 
Very  serious  28 
) 
)  69% 
Somewhat  serious  41  ) 
Not  so  serious  13% 
Not  at all serious  3% 
Don't  know  15% 
100% 
The  same  set of questions was  asked  in  1978. 1  In  the  space  of  four years, 
public opinion appears  to have  become  somewhat  less  committed:  there has 
been no  variation in the  number  of  those  who  disbelieve  the  claim that if 
nuclear power  stations  are not built,  there will necessarily be restrictions 
on  electricity consumption  in the  long  term,  whereas  there  are  now  many  more 
don't knows  (23%  instead of  14%)  and  less  Europeans  who  are  convinced by 
this  argument. 
1  See  Annex  B3. -48-
Nevertheless,  supposing  that it proved necessary  to  cut.down on  consumption, 
the public is  even more  convinced  than during  the  preceding  survey  that 
this would  be  somewhat  serious or very  serious  (69%  instead of  62%  in 1978). 
In  the  1982  survey,  it appears  that nearly half  (46%)  of  the  European  public 
as  a  whole  accept  the  argument  that if we  do  not build nuclear  power 
stations,  we  render ourselves  liable  to restrictions on electricity con-
sumption,  whereas  only  38%  saw  the  development  of nuclear power  as  "worth-
while". 
A country-by-country  scrutiny of  the  two  sets of replies  reveals  that the 
latter are highly correlative in all  the Member  States  and  that  throughout 
the  Community  - except  in the  United Kingdom  - the credibility of  the  risk 
involved  in not  developing nuclear  power  is greater than the  spontaneous 
support  for  the  development  of this energy  source, 
Credibility of  the  argument 
"no  development  = restrictions 
in the  long  term" 
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The  development  of 
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11worthwhile" -49-
The  question  can also be  raised whether belief fn  this  argument  is  connected 
with  the  fear  that  the  country would  be  faced with  a  serious  or extremely 
serious  energy crisis in ten years'  time,  The  link between  the  two  replies 
appears  to be  much  weaker here,  and  generally speaking  (with  the  exception 
of France),  belief in the  risk  involved  in not  developing nuclear power  is 
appreciably less widespread  than  the belief in an  energy crisis in ten years' 
time. 
Table  VI  compares  the  replies  from  each Member  State to the  three  questions 
mentioned  in the  foregoing. 
TABLE  VI  - COMPARISON  OF  THE  REPLIES  TO  THE  THREE  QUESTIONS  ON  THE  FUTURE 
ENERGY  SITUATION 
A - "If we  do  not develop nuclear power  stations,  we  render our-
selves  liable in the  long  term  to restrictions on  energy 
consumption". 
B  - "The  development of nuclear potJ,er  is worthwhile ". 
c - "In  ten years'  time,  there Mill be  a  very  serious or fairly 
serious e.nergy  crisis". 
A  B  c  Ratio  Ratio 
A  A 
%  %  %  ....!L  c  -
B  34  27  62  1.26  .55 
'  DK  32  25  44  1.28  .72 
D  47  37  61  1.27  .77 
F  62  51  57  1.20  [i:-§8] 
IRL  21  13  56  1.62  .38 
I  54  34  78  1.59  .69 
L  54  32  60  1.69  ,90 
NL  42  34  43  1.24  .98 
UK  33  39  56  .85  I  59 
GR  18  15  39  1.20  ,46 
EEC  46  38  61  1.21  .75 -~-
[  III - RISK  PERCEPTION 
THE  RISK  INHERENT  IN  NUCLEAR  POWER  STATIONS  AS  COMPARED  WITH  OTHER 
INDUSTRIAL  PLANT 
The  following  question was  introduced in the  interview after the  questions 
about  the  energy crisis  and  before  tackling  the  specific questions  about 
nuclear power  stations.  It was  aimed  at making  the  interviewee assess  in 
relative terms  the risk  involved  in  living near  a  nuclear  power  station in 
comparison with  other types  of installation.  The  list was  deliberately 
long  and  included  installations  that  are  deemed  to be  free  of danger. 
Question:  On  this list you  will find a  number  of different kinds of 
industrial installations.  Among  these aould you  seleat three 
whiah  in your  opinion~  areate  the greatest risk for people 
living nearby? 
- An  oil refinery 
- A coal-fired power station 
- A large  airfield or airport 
- A food  factory 
- A nuclear  power  station which  uses  atomic 
energy  to  produce electricity 
- A chemical  factory  (producing  sulphuric 
acid,  ammonia,  chlorine,  etc.) 
- An  explosive  factory 
- A factory  for  processing natural  gas 
- A furniture  factory 
- A dam  producing hydro-electric power 
- Don't  know 
%  Rank 
23 
2 
16 
2 
60 
71 
64 
15 
1 
6 
5 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1  Total  greater than  100  as  a  result of multiple replies. 
In 1982,  therefore,  three  types  of industrial installation were  considered 
to present  a  high  degree  of risk.  Nuclear power  stations were  ranked  third, 
after chemical  plants  and  explosive  factories.  Oil refineries,  large air-
fields  or airports  and  natural-gas  processing plants were  placed  far behind. -51-
CAN  A NUCLEAR  POWER  STATION  EXPLODE  LIKE  A BOMB? 
Question:  People  have  been  talking about  the possibility of accidents 
taking place in nuclear pou.,er  plants,  What  about a  nuclear 
explosion like that of a  bomb  used in Japan  in World  War  II; 
would  you  say  that an  explosion of this type in one  of the 
nuclear power  plants now  operating is very  likely~  somewhat 
likely~  not very  likely~  or technically impossible?1 
% 
Very  likely  10 
) 
)  38 
Somewhat  likely  28  ) 
Not  very  likely  38 
) 
)  47 
Technically  impossible  9  ) 
Don't  know  15 
100 
As  can be  seen  from  these figures,  the prevailing opinion  is that  an 
explosion is not  very likely or even  impossible,  but  large minorities  take 
the  view  that  such  an  explosion  is  somewhat  or  even very  likely,  and  the 
latter opinions  are expressed  in all walks. of life.  2 
The  fear of explosion decreases  as  people  become  more  familiar with  and  live 
closer to nuclear  power  stat  ions:  those  who  live  in the vicinity of  (less 
than  30  miles  away  from)  a  nuclear power  station  tend  to belie.ve  that  an 
explosion is less  likely.  Furthermore,  the  fear  is much  less widespread 
in countries  where  nuclear  power  is highly-developed  than  in those  that have 
no  nuclear plant. 
l  This  question has  been  taken  from  a  survey  carried out  in  September  1980. 
by  the  Survey  Research  Center,  Institute  for  Social  Research  at  the  Uni-
versity of Michigan.  The  results obtained at  that  time  in the  United. 
States  are  remarkably  similar to  the European results  given  above~ 
explosion very  likely:  12%;  somewhat  likely:  28%;  not  very  likely:  46%; 
technically  impossible:  8%;  and  don't. know:  6%. 
2  For  example,  among  Europeans  who  have  received  the  iongest  education,  9% 
think that  an  explosion is very  likely,  23%  that it is  somewhat  likely, 
46%  that it is not  very  likely and  only  13%  consider  that it is impossible. -52-
Proportion of  those  interviewed who  take  the  view that an  explosion  is very 
or somewhat  likely: 
France  31%  Netherlands  41% 
Federal Republic of  Italy  41% 
Germany  29%  Luxembourg  53% 
United Kingdom  42%  Denmark  35% 
Belgium  46%  Ireland  56% 
Those  living near  a  Greece  65%  nuclear power  station 
(30 miles  or less)  33% 
THE  LEAGUE  TABLE  OF  RISKS  INHERENT  IN  NUCLEAR  POWER  STATIONS 
Question:  Again~  about  dangers~  I  am  going  to mention certain dangers 
which  people  sometimes  mention when  talking about nuclear power 
stations.  Which  of these dangers  do  you  believe one  may  have 
reason  to seriously worry  about? 
The  explosion of  the  power  station 
The  radioactive  gaseous  emissions 
whilst  the  power  station is working 
The  danger of storage of radioactive 
waste 
Don't  know 
% 
23 
51 
57 
13 
1 
1  Total greater than  100  as  a  result of multiple replies. 
The  public is therefore worried most  of all about  the  storage of radioactive 
waste.  "the  idea of this radiation which  seems  to  last  for all eternity,,,  " 
HUMAN  ERROR  OR  TECHNICAL  BREAKDOWN? 
Question:  If such  a  thing was  to  happen~  in your opinion what  could be  the 
reason  for  this:  a  technical breakdown  or a  human  error? 
A technical  breakdown 
A human  error 
Both 
Don't know 
22% 
27% 
37% 
40% 
100% (5) 
-53-
IV  - THE  IMAGE  OF  NUCLEAR  POWER  STATIONS 
Over  and  above  the_crucial  questions  we  have  just described,  the  European 
survey has  provided  additional  information  about  the  image  nuclear  power 
stations have  in  the  public eye.  The  people  interviewed had  to  say whether 
they  agreed  or  disagreed with  eleven  statements  about  the  advantages  or 
drawbacks. attributed to nuclear  power  stations.  This  gives  us  a  picture of 
the  most  frequent  commonplaces, 
As  far  as  the  positive  commonplaces  are  concerned,  there  is  a  broad  con-
sensus  on  the  statement  that nuclear power  stations  can  provide extra 
electricity resources  and  that nuclear power  production has  a  favourable 
effect  on  the  general  economy  of  the  country.  Admittedly,  agreement  on 
these  two  points  is more  or less widespread  according  to  the  country  con-
cerned  (the French  being by  far  the most  positive),  but  even  in  the  least 
enthusiastic countries,  few  people  disagreed with  these  two  arguments;  the 
latter generally preferred  to  abstain. 
Two  statements of a  technical  or economic  nature  are held  to be  true by 
large minorities,  while  large parts  of  the  public  admit  to not  knowing  any-
thing about  them:  these  are  that nuclear  power  is  a  clean  form  of energy 
and  that electricity from nuclear power  is  cheaper  to  produce,  Many  people 
were  unable  to  give  any  reply  about  the  latter statement  in particular, 
even  in those  countries  that  are  in  favour  of nuclear energy  (40%  of don't 
knows  in France,  29%  in  the Federal  Republic  of Germany,  43%  in Italy and 
46%  in  the  United  Kingdom), 
Lastly,  European  opinion on  safety is  divided.  When  faced with  the assertion 
that 
11the  safety measures  tak"!n  at nuclear  power  stations  are  so strict that 
they eliminate nearly all the  danger",  41%  agree  and  37%  disagree.  The 
answers  to this  question make  it possible  to understand  one  of  the  main 
divisions  in public opinion with  regard  to nuclear energy:  we  will  come 
back  to  this  later. -~-
As  regards  the  negative  commonplaces,  a  wide-ranging  consensus  can  be  observed 
on  three  statements,  namely  that nuclear power  stations  can  be  dangerous  for 
the  people who  work  in  them,  the  numerous  safety precautions  are  a  clear 
indication that by  their very nature  power  stations  are  dangerous,  and  the 
proliferation in  the  number  of nuclear  power  stations  is  dangerous. 
The  idea  put  forward  in certain quarters  that  any nuclear installation can 
be  secretly put  to  use  for military purposes  encounters  some  sympathy  among 
the  public,  as  well  as  the  fear  that  atomic materials  could be  stolen by 
terrorists. 
Lastly,  the  assertion that "taking everything  into  account,  producing 
electricity by nuclear power is not  really worthwhile"  is  supported by  only 
30%  of  those  interviewed.  Ireland is the only country  in which  it clearly 
dominates  among  those who  expressed  an  opinion. 
Strictly speaking,  the  study  of  the  salient points  of  the  image  nuclear 
power  stations have  in  the public eye  is highly  revealing when  opinions  are 
compared  against  the  basic  option  concerning  the  development  of nuclear 
power.  The  large  table  on  p.  57,  which  presents  the  results of this  analysis, 
merits  detailed scrutiny. 
This  table  shows  that  in general,  opponents  of nuclear power  adopt  the  most 
radical stances,  in particular on  aspects  concerning risks,  and  repudiate 
the  economic  advantages  of nuclear energy  or  take  refuge  in abstention  (37% 
of opponents  go  as  far  as  not  replying  to  the  statement  that  thanks  to 
nuclear  power  stations,  we  shall have  available extra resources  of electri-
city).  The  replies  are highly  emotional. 
On  the  other hand,  those  in  favour of  the  development  of nuclear power  adopt 
more  subtle positions:  they  are  sensitive  to  the  economic  and  technical 
arguments  (extra source  of energy,  favourable  effect on  the  general  economy 
of  the  country,  cheaper energy  to  produce  and  clean  form of energy),  but 
they  do  not  deny  that certain hazards  and  risks exist (for the  people  who 
work  in nuclear  power stations  in particular).  They  acknowledge  the  idea 55 
that  the  numerous  safety precautions  are  a .clear indication that by  _their 
very nature  power  stations  are  dangerous,  while at  the  same  time  the 
majority of  them are  convinced  that  the safety measures  taken  are  so strict 
that  they  eliminate nearly all  the  dangers.  Their replies  are  of a  more 
.  1  1  rat1ona  nature. 
The  following  pages  contain conventional  analyses  of  the  answers  given  on 
the  various  points. 
The  authors  of this report have  endeavoured  to  take  this  research  even 
further,  with  a  view  to  constructing a  structural diagram of  the  attitudes 
to nuclear  power  and  their component  parts.  The  technique  used  is  that  of 
factor  analysis  of correspondences.  The  results  are  shown  in Annex  B6 
(p.  74). 
1  See  on  this  topic  the  article by Maurice  Tubiana  in Information et 
Reflexions,  July  1979,  No  2:  For  an  approach  to  the  study of the public's 
reactions  to nuclear  energy,  "  ... It is therefore  apparent  that while 
hostility to nuclear energy  is  based mainly  on myths  and  fears,  the 
active  opponents  and  supporters  of nuclear energy  do  not  speak  the  same 
language.  The  information given by  pro-nuclear circles is based  on 
factual  data  and  an objective analysis of the  advantages  and  disadvan-
tages.  It is not  on  its  own  able  to enlist public  support:  it is 
necessary,  but sufficient  , ..  "  '· 56 
TABL£  VII  -THE  IMAGE  OF  NUCLEAR  POWER  STATIONS  (salient points  In  decreasing  order  of  fre.qaency} 
NEGATI V£  POINTS  POSiTIV£  POINTS 
According  to  the  basic  According  to  the  basic 
option:  option: 
the  developaent  of  the  development  of 
nuclear  power:  nuclear  power: 
Is  Involves  Is  Involves 
OVERAll  worth- unacceptab 1  e  OVERAll  worth- unacceptab 1  e 
vhile  risks  while  risks 
Nuclear  power  stations  can  ~a  Thanks. to  nuclear  pover 
dangerous  for  the  peop 1  e who 
[ill  t1QJ 
statlons._we  shall  have 
work  In  thn  Agree  73  available  extra  resources 
01 sagree  11+  28  ~  of  electricity 
1m  (ill  Agree  n 
Don 1t  know  13  11  6 
100 
Disagree  15  ~  7 
Don't  know  13  3  37 
The  nu•erous  safety precautions  100 
are  a clear  Indication  that  by 
their very  nature  nuclear  power  Nuclear  Power  production 
stations are  dangerous 
[ill  @ 
has  a favourable  effect 
Agree  67  on  the  general  economy 
Disagree  18  33  6  of  the  country 
[ill  Agree  55  ~ 
Don •t  know  15  11  8 
Disagree  19  9  33 
100 
Don't  know  26  12  27 
The  Increase  In  the  number  of  100 
nuclear  power  stations Is 
dangerous  Agree  61  ~  ill]  uclear  power  Is  a clean 
ora  of  energy 
Disagree  20  43  3  Agree  " 
@  27 
Don 1t  know  13  11  4  01 sagree  30  20  @) 
100  Don't  know  26  15  24 
Any  nuclear  Installation  100 
can  be  secretly put  ta  use 
ectrlclty from  nuclear  for  military  purposes  A 
~  lli]  gree  55  over  Is  cheaper  to 
O.liagree  21  31  n  oduce  Agree  41  @I  27 
Don't  know  24  19  17  Dlsagree  20  13  32 
100  Don't  know  39  26  Till 
Ato1lc  .aterlals used  In  100 
these  stations could  be 
, The  safety  measures  taken  stolen  by  terrorists  Agree  47  :m  I~  at  nuclear  power  stations 
Dl sagrea  33  41  26  are  so  strict that  they 
. ellalnate nearly  all  the 
Oan•t  know  20  14  15  danger  @J  Agree  41  20 
100 
01 sagree  31  21  t@ 
Taking  everything ·Into  Don't  know  22  12  20 
account,  producing 
100  electricity by  nuclear 
power  Is  not  realy 
llil  werthvblle  Agree  30  12 
Disagree  45  mJ  2-t 
Don't  know  25  12  22 
100 (6) 
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In  the  final analysis,  the  complexity of the attitudes  can be  summarized 
by  the  extent to which  two  main  considerations  are  taken  into account: 
- the  economic  argument:  if we  do  not  develop nuclear power,  we  shall have 
to cut  down  on  electricity consumption; 
- the safety argument:  the  safety measures  taken at nuclear  power  stations 
are  so strict that  they  eliminate nearly all the 
danger. 
In  the  European public  as  a  whole,  similar proportions  - approximately  four 
people  in  ten  - accept  each  of  these  two  arguments,  the  economic  argument 
enlisting a  little more  support  (46%)  than  the  argument  that safety measures 
are  effective  (41%).  Sex,  age,  education level  and  even  the  degree  of 
cognitive mobilization only marginally affect  these  figures.  On  the  other 
hand,  two  variables  influence  the  results  considerably:  position on  the 
left-right poiitical scale  and nationality. 
As  we  move  from  left to right,  belief in  the  economic  argument  increases 
. (from 44%  on  the  left up  to  59%  on  the  right);  the  difference  is much 
greater in  the  case  of  the  safety  argument  (25%  on  the  left and  60~ on  the 
right)  (Fig.  13). 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the positions  adopted by  the  individual  Hember  States 
with  respect  to  these  two  arguments  (Fig. 14): 
- only  one  country,  France,  adopts  a  favourable  position  on  both  arguments; 
- three  countries  adopt  a  negative  stance  on  both lines:  Denmark,  Ireland 
and especially Greece; 
- two  countries  are  very  close  to  the central position:  the  Federal 
Republic  of Germany  and  the Netherlands; 
- two  countries  tend  to  accept  the  economic  argument while  casting doubt 
on  the  safety of nuclear  power  stations:  Luxembourg  and  Italy; 
- lastly,  two  countries  tend  to  accept  that  the  safety measures  taken 
eliminate nearly all danger,  but are  not  convinced  of  the  economic  value 
of developing nuclear  power:  Belgium and  the United Kingdom. 
The  graph  on  p.  59  illustrates the  position of  the  ten Member  States of  the 
Community.  The  table  on  p.  60  presents all the statistical results  that 
have  just been mentioned. Safety 
argument 
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50% 
40% 
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Fig.  13:  Position of  the  different political  groupings  according  to 
their attitude  towards  the  economic  argument  and  the  safety 
argument, -59-
Safety  argument: 
the  safety measures  taken 
are  so  strict that  they 
eliminate nearly all the 
danger 
70S 
BELIEVE  IN  SAFETY  BUT 
NOT  IN  THE  ECONOMIC 
60S 
ARGUMENT 
eUK 
5~ 
eB 
I 
I 
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I 
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I 
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•  IRL 
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eL 
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Economic  argument: 
if we  don't  develop, 
nuclear power,  we  shall 
have  to  cut  down  on 
electricity consumption 
Fig.  14:  Position of the  individual Member  States  according  to  their 
attitude  towards  the  economic  argument  and  the  safety  argument. -60-
TABLE  VIII  - BELIEF  IN  THE  ARGUMENTS  IN  FAVOUR  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  NUCLEAR 
POWER 
ECONOMIC  ARGUMENT  SAFETY  ARGUMENT 
If we  don't  develop  Safety measures  are 
nuclear power,  we  so  strict that  they 
shall have  to cut  eliminate nearly all 
down  on  electricity  danger 
consumption 
%  % 
TOTAL  46  41 
Men  50  46 
Women  42  36 
Age:  15-19  47  38 
20-24  41  37 
25-29  41  37 
30-39  44  41 
40-49  50  44 
50-59  49  43 
60  and  over  46  42 
Age  on  comEletion  of  full-time 
education:  15  and  under  43  39 
16-19  47  43 
20  and  over  53  46 
Leadershi;2:  L  37  37 
L  - 48  40 
L  +  49  44 
L  ++  48  42 
Position  on  the  left-ris:ht scale 
Left  1-2  44  25 
3-4  41  34 
5-6  46  44 
7-8  55  54 
Right  9-10  59  60 
Scale  on  which nuclear Eower  is 
develoEed: 
(France  62  47 
(Federal  Republic  of 
Large  (  Germany  47  38 
(United Kingdom  33  57 
(Belgium  34  47 
Small  (Netherlands  42  39 
(Italy  54  28 
Non- (Luxembourg  54  32 
existent  (Denmark  32  35 
(Ireland  21  25 
(Greece  18  17 
See  in Annex  B5  the variance  study,  which  establishes  the  relative  impor-
tance  of  the  different variables  examined  in this  table  and  of  some  other 
variables. ANNEXES 
A.  FEATURE  OF  THE  SURVEY 
DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  SURVEY 
TECHNICAL  DETAILS 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
B.  REFERENCE  MATERIAL  TAKEN  FROM 
EARLIER  STUDIES -~-
ANNEX  A-1 
D E  S  C R  I  P  T  I  0  N  0  F  T  H  E  S  U R V E  Y 
The  study was  carried out by  the association,  European  Omnibus  Survey,  in 
conjunction with work  on  Eurobarometer No  17.  It was  based  on  a 
questionnaire  consisting of twenty  questions,  the French  and English version 
of which  are  listed in this  Annex. 
The  questionnaire was  submitted  to representative national  samples  of  people 
aged  15  and  over  in  the  ten  Community  countries,  the  total number  of inter-
viewees  being 9  700.  All  interviews  were  conducted at home  by  professional 
interviewers  between March  and  May  1982. 
The  table  on  the  following  page  lists those  institutes  taking part  in  the 
research,  together with  the number  of interviews  carried out  in each  country. 
The  results  presented in the  report  for  the  Community  as  a  whole  are based 
on  a  weighting of  the national  samples,  each  country being represented  in 
the total  in direct proportion  to  the  size of its population. 
SAMPLING 
The  object of  the  sampling method  is to  achieve  a  representative cross-
section of  the entire population of the  ten  Community  countries,  aged  15 
and  over. 
Each  national  sample  is constituted at  two  levels: 
1  - Areas  in which  survey  taken 
European  Community  statistics divide  the  whole  area into 129  regions. 
The  survey was  carried out  in  126  of  these  (the exception being Corsica, 
Greenland  and  Val  d'Aosta). -63-
ANNEX  A-1  (cont'd) 
1  - Each  country  assembled  on  a  random basis  a  master  sample  for  the  local-
ities in which  the  survey was  to be  conducted.  This  was  done  in  such 
a  way  that all types  of residential area were  represented  in proportion 
to their respective  population. 
In total,  the  interviews  for  the  European  Omnibus  Survey  took place  in 
about  1  150  survey  areas. 
2  - Choice  of  interviewees 
Different  interviewees  are  used  for  each  survey.  The  random master 
sample mentioned  above  gives  the  number  of people  to be  interviewed 
in each  survey area.  At  the next  stage  the  interviewees  are  selected: 
- by  taking names  at  random  from  lists in countries  in which  it is 
possible  to have  access  to exhaustive  lists of individuals  or house-
hplds:  Belgium,  the Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Luxembourg; 
- by  means  of stratified sampling  on  the basis of census  statistics, 
the  sample  being  compiled  on  the basis  of sex,  age  and  occupation: 
France,  Italy,  the United Kingdom,  Ireland  and  Germany; 
-by a  method  combining  the  two  described  above  (systematic progression): 
Greece. -64-
ANNEX  A-2 
T E  C H N I  C A L  D E  T A I  L  S  0  F  T H E  E  N E  R G Y  S  U R V E Y 
COUNTRY  INSTITUTE  CARRYING  DATES  OF  SURVEY  NUMBER  OF 
OUT  SURVEY  INTERVIEWS 
BELGIUM  DIMARSO  23  March  - 8  April  1982  1006 
DENMARK  GALLUP  3-18  April  1982  1063  MARKEDANALYSE 
GERMANY  EMNID  29  March  - 16  April  1982  1063 
FRANCE  INSTITUT  DE  SONDAGE  8  April  - 3  May  1982  999  LAVIALLE 
IRELAND  IRISH  MARKETING  8-21  April  1982  983  SURVEYS 
ITALY  DOXA  30  March  - 22  April  1982  1084 
LUXEMBOURG  ILRES  25  March  - 22  April  1982  299 
NETHERLANDS  NIPO  1-16  April  1982  1028 
UNITED  KINGDOM  SOCIAL  SURVEYS  31  March  - 10  April  1982  1259  (GALLUP  POLL)  LTD 
GREECE  ICAP-HELLAS  22  March  - 16  April  1982  999 (7) 
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ANNEX'  A-3 
QUESTIONS  228  A  258  POUR  TOUS  LES  PAYS. 
228.  Estimez-vous  qu'fl  y  a  aujourd'hui  (en  France)  en  pro-
bleme  de  1  ·~nergie  ? 
Sl our,  Estimez-vous  que  c'est un  problm tres grave, 
assez grave  ou  pas  tr~s grave  ? 
229.  Et  dans  dfx  ans,  estfmez-vous  qu'fl  y  aura  (en  France) 
un  probl @me  de  1  '~nergie  ? 
sr  QUI  :  Estimez-vous  que  ce  sera  un  probl@me  tres 
gravi~8
assez  grav~ 2
3u pas  trh grave  ? 
Aujourd'hui  Dans  dix  ans 
1  1  Tr~s grave 
2  2  Assez  grave 
3  3  Pas  tres grave 
4  4  Pas  de  probl@me 
0  0  ? 
230/Diff~rentes solutions  sont envisageables  pour  r~pondre 
231  aux  probl@mes  d'approvisionnement  de  (la  France)  en 
~nergfe. Dans  la liste suivante,  quelle est celle qui 
vous  paraTt  la  plus  appropri~e ? Et  en  second  lieu  ? 
230  231  (HONTRER  LA  CARTE  J) 
en  en 
ler ze 
1  1  Acheter ou  continuer a acheter a l'~tranger ce 
qui  nous  manque  comme  ~nergie. 
2  2  Pousser les  recherches  n~cessa  fres ·pour mettre au 
point et developper  1 'utflfsatfon des  energies 
renouvelables  (solaire,  biomasse,  ~nergie des 
marees,  etc .••  ) 
3  3  oevelopper la  production  d'~nergie  nucl~aire 
4  4  Intensifier ou  remettre  en  exploitation  les 
ressources  ~nerg~tiques traditionnelles  (par exem-
ple  :charbon,  lignite,  tourbe) 
5  5  Economher  1 'l!nP.rgfe 
0  0  ? 
232.  Depufs  quelques  ann~es, avez-vous  personnellement fait 
1 'une ou  1 'autre des  chases  sufvantes  ?  (Montrer la 
carte K ) 
232  233  234 
1  1  1  Dfmfnu~ vos  d~penses de  chauffages  en  arn~-
liorant 1 'isolation de  votre maison  (par 
exemple  double vitrages, meilleure  isolation 
du  toft,  r~glage de  vos  appareils  de  chauf-
fage,  etc ...  ) 
2  2  2  Dfmfnu~ vos  d~penses de  chauffage en  chauf-
fant un  peu  moins. 
3  3  3  Diminu~ vos  d~penses d'essence  pour  la  voi~ 
ture  (en  circulant moins  avec  la  voiture, 
en  condufsant  plus  calmement  etc ..• ) 
4  4  4  Economis~ sur 1 ·~clafrage ou  le  fonctfonne-
ment  de  vos  apparefls  ~lectriques. 
233.  Sur  ces  dfff~rents points,  (carte  K)  avez-vous  1' im-
pression  que  vbus  pcrsonnellement  vous  pourriez fafre 
plus  d'i!conomfe  que  vous  n'en  faftes  actuellement  ? 
234.  Et  les gens  autour de  vous,  pensez-vous  qu'ils  pour-
rafent  fafre  plus  d'i!conomfes  qu'fls n'en  font  et  sur 
quels  points  ?  (Carte K  ) 
QUESTIONS  228  TO  258  FOR  ALL  COUNTRIES. 
228.  flo  you.  th.i.nk thltJI.t  .U  an  CI!Utg!(  p~tobtem hr.  l!(owt  tOUJ!t.\!(1 
todaq 1 
lF  YES,  flo  !(OU.  thhr.~ .U .i6  UltJI.!(  4e!Liou..6,  &tWI.t!f  4eMDu4  o.\ 
llo.t  UltJI.!(  4eiL£ou..6  1 
tf9.  And  hr. ttl! tWt' 4  t.bnt,  do  !fOil  th.i.nk  thvr.t w.iU  bt a11  tiiUtg !( 
p!toblem  .c.n  !fOUl!.  cou.lltitvl  1  --
IF  YES,  flo  !(OU  thhr.k ,U w.iU  bt uVI.!(  4e!Liou..6,  &ri..iA.ty  4elt.(.oll.4 
01fiOt  UltJI.!(2~~11.4  1 
Todtt!{  ln ttl! !(Wt4 
'  '  t  2 
3  3 
4  4 
0  0 
VltJI.!f  4 eiLiou..6 
FtWI..t!{  4111t.lo11.4 
Not u  VI.!(  4111t.lo11.4 
No  p!tobtem 
1 
230/  fl.iUMtllt pou.ib.i.UU.u  can  bt thought o&  44  4ollA.t.iolt4  to the 
231.  p1to6tem  o6  ~'4  tnUtg!( 4uppl.iu.  D 1h.ith 4ollLU.on  do  !fOil 
6ttt .U.  mo4t  ttpp!tOpU.tt.tt  1 aru1  .tht nut ?  (SHOW  CARfl  J I. 
230  231 
~SttOPI.~ 
t 
3 
4 
s 
0 
t 
3 
4 
5 
0 
To  P.u!(  Oil  eont.Utut ·.to  bu!(  6JLOIII  abll011d  .to  rrwtkt  up  &  011. 
lUI!(  4hol!..t64U  hr.  U!Utg!f  4uppUu.  · 
To  flll!OU/1.4gt  .tht JLUtaiteh  netdtd .to  4otut the .t~ltn.i­
Cilt  p~tobt111114  o&  ,  aru1  put hr..to  pil4C.t.i.c.t  me.thod4  o& 
p~t.aduc.i.lrg  lltlltw:~btt tlltltg!f.  !Solalt  poW~tJL,  tlll!g!f  6'l0111 
b.iotog.iciz.t  40UII.Ct4,  .t.idttt  poW~tJL, e.te ••• 1 
To  flevttop o.t hr.e'lt44t p!toduc.t.ion  o6  IW.c.tta~t  poweJr.. 
To  hr.e'lt44e  011.  JLII.Iltw  expto.i.tati.on  o6  ll.llltJI.9Y  6JLOIII 
.tltatU.t.ioM.t  40Uittt4  I  e.g.  c.oa..t.,  Ugn.i.tt  o.ot  MolAl! 
coa..t.,  ptllt) • 
To  4aue  ll.llltJI.gY  , 
232  23J  234 
J 
4  4 
Rtduc.e  htllthr.g  co4.t4  b!(  .imp!touhtg  the .iMu.l4.t.lon  hr. 
!fOUl!.  hO!IIe  (e.g. doubte gl4z.i.lrg,  .bnp~toued .otoo6  .in-
4ulat.ion,  adjll.6.tmen.t  o6  the co~ot4 o6  !fOUl!.  httt-
.t.U!g  equ.ipmtllt,  e.te ...  )  \ 
t  ReciU.ee  hll.llt.i.ng  eo4.t4  by uduc.hr.g  .the .templl.ltll.tuitt 
o.t  ~t~~~ou.nt  o6  htllt you  11.4t. 
J  Cut  rfOIAII  pe.tltot  U4ed  .in  !fOUl!.  CM  (by U4.i.lrg  the C4ll 
!U4,  b!(  M.i.u.ing  mo.tt  gent!.!(  e.te ••• 1 
4  Ec.onom.U.t  hr. Light-ing  o.t  .the  11.4t  o6  o.t1tt.ot  eteetlt..£-
Cil.t.  appl.ianc.u  !(OU  have hr.  !(owt  h0111t. 
233.  On  thut d.i66vr.tllt  po.int4  (Show  CMd K I, do  1J011.  ~ttl that  !fOU. 
eou.td  pll.lt4onAUy mah.t  mOII.t  4avhtg4 .than  you  do  110111  ? 
234.  flo  you  &ett .that o.thltJI.  peopte .in  !(Owt  ne.ighb011.1thood  c.ou.td .. do 
mo.te  about  II.IIUtg!(  4o.u.ing  .than  .tht!( do  110111  and  .in wh.ic.h  cuiy4  hr. 
p:vr.UculM o6  .the  6ew  I  have mll.ll.t.iontd  ?  I  Sho1u  Cllll.d  K I -66-
:t35. 
ANNEX  A-3 
Sur  cette 11ste  se  trouvent  un  certain  ~bre d'lnstalla-
tions  industrielles,  (Montrer  llste).  V~illez me  dire 
quelles  sont  les  trois qui,  selon  vous,  font  courlr le 
plus grand  risque  aux  populations avoh nantes  ? 
(3  REPONSES) 
1  Une.rafffnerfe  de  p~trole 
2  Une  centrale  ~lectrfque fonctfonnant  au  charbon 
3  Un  grand  a~rodrome  / 
4  Une  usfne  de  produfts  alfmentafres 
5  Une  centrale  ~lectrique  nucl~af re, c 'est-A-dire  qui 
utilise  l'~nergfe atomique  pour  produfre  l'~lectriciU 
6  Une  usfne  chimique  :  acfde  suifurlque, chlore, anuno-
nlaque,  etc .•. 
7 Une  uslne  fabrlquant  des  exploslfs 
8  Une  usfne  de  traltement  de  gaz  naturel 
9  Une  manufacture  de  meuble  / 
X  Un  barrage  fafsant  fonc_tlonner  une  centrale electrfque 
0  ? 
236.  Savez-vous  s'll  y  a  une  centrale  nucl~alre en  activit~. 
en  construction ou  en  projet  pr~s de  1 'endrolt oD  vous 
habftez  1 
1  Centrale en  actfvfte 
2  Centrale  en  construction 
3  Centrale  en  projet 
4  Pas  de  centrale 
0  1 
237.  (SI  OUI  AUX  CODES  1,  2  OU  3  EN  236). 
A quelle distance  de  votre  domicile  se  trouve  cette 
centrale nucleafre  en  activit~ ou  en  construction ou 
en  projet  1  (Sf  plusfeurs,  demander  la  plus  proche). 
1  Mofns  de  5  km 
2  5 a 10  km 
J  10 a 50  km 
4  so  a 100  km 
5  Plus  de  100  km 
0  1 
238.  Tout  developpement  fndustrlel  demande  des  efforts, du 
temps  et de  l'argcnt;  11  peut  comporter  aussf  certains 
rfsques. 
Vofcf  trois opinions  au  sujet du  developpement  des  cen-
trales nucleafres,  c'est-~-dire des  Installations quf 
utflfsent l'energfe atomique  pour  produire  l'electriclte 
Pouvez-vous  -me  dire  laquelle  est  la 
plus  proche  de  votre opfnfon  personnelle a ce  sujet  ? 
1  Cela  vaut  le coup 
2  C'est. sans  fnt~r@t 
3  Cela  pr~sente des  dangers  fnacceptables 
0  1 
235.  On  tJW.  .t.U.t  !fOU  wU.l  6-ind  o.  IIWIIbvt o6  cU66vtent  /WtcU,  o6 
~  wto.Uation.~  [Show  CMdl.  Among  thue could  you 
aetect 3 which .in  yowt  op.in.ion,  Clteo.te  the gileo.tut wlu. 
'Oil people Uv.ing  neMby  r 
l  Petllo! ile6.iltell.!f 
2  A coo.l-6-illed  poWell.  ato..Uon 
3  A lo.llge o..ill6.ield  Oil  o..illpollt 
4  A 6ood  6o.ct01ly 
[3  ANSWERS) 
5  A nu.cleM  powell,, ato.t.ion  wh.i.c.lt  uau o.tiJIII¢  enell.g !I to p11.0duce 
d~y. 
6  A cltem.WI.l  6a&Oil!f  I  p11.0duc.ing  au!6~  o.c.UJ.,  amnon.Ut, 
e~ne, ete .•• ) 
7  All  Uplo4.iVU  6act01ly 
•  A &o.ctOily  601l  p\OCU4.Lng  ruz.WLo.!  go.a 
9  A 6Uiln.Ltuile  6o.ctoily 
X  A dam  ptodue.Lng  hydilo  dectll.£c  poWM 
0  , 
236.  Do  you  ILnow  .L6  .Ln  the Mea wheu you  Uue the11.e  .La  a  nu.cleM 
poWell.  ato..Uon,  o.ctuaUy woilR.ing,  oil  one  be-ing  bu.L!t,  Oil  one 
.in the plann.Utg  ato.g u  ? 
I  AcbJ.aUy  WOilR.ing 
2  One  b  •  bu.L!t 
3  One  .L~e  plann-ing  ato.gu 
4  None 
0  , 
237.  (IF CODE  I,  2.0113  IN  236). 
How  6M  IIWl!l  6ilom  yoUil  home  .La  th.La  actual  Oil  planned  nucleo.Jl 
poWell.  ato..Uon  f  I I 6 mOile  than one  to.ILe  the neMut  I 
I  LU4  than  3 mllu 
t  3 to 6 m.U:u 
J  1 .to  30  mUu 
4  5I  to 60  mUu 
S  Mo.u ·than  60  mUu 
0  , 
231.  AU  nw development .in  the. .Lnduatll.Lal  6-Letd  .impUu e66ollt, 
t.Lme  and money,  .Lt may  a-lao  .Lnvo!ve wiL. 
He/I.e  Me 3  op.Ln.Lon.~ about the de.velopme.nt  o6  nucleM  poWell. 
ato.Uona,  wh.Lclt  uae  o.tom.Lc  enell.gl(  noil  the p!loduct.ion  o6 
el~!J.  Wh.Lelt  o6  thue  3  ato.tementa  comu  · 
c:..toaut to  yol.lll  o~~ot~  op.Ln.Lon  on the deve-lopment  o6  nucleM 
powelL  f 
J  r  t  .La  wollthwh.u:e 
t  No  pM.t.icu!M .inttAut 
3  The  II..U.IL4  .involved Me unaecepto.ble 
0  , 
TREND  PARTIAL  BARO.  IO.A  - Q.  148 
239.  On  dft aussf  que  sf  nous  ne  developpons  pas  les centrales 
nucl~afres,  nous  serons  bfent6t  oblfg~s de  restrefndre 
notre  consommatlon  d'~lectrfcfte. Croyez-vous  que  c'est 
vral  ou  non  ? 
1  C'est vral · 
2  Ce  n'est pas  vraf 
0  ? 
239.  Some  aay that .l6  we  don't cont-inue to develop nucleall poWM, 
we  4ha.U  40on  hAve.  .to  cut down  on  electM.c.Lty  eon~ump.tion. 
flo  you  th.Lnk  .th.La  .La  tllue !Ill  not  f 
I  TllUe 
2  Not  tllue 
0  f 
TREND  PARTIAL  BARO.  1  O.A  - Q.  160 
240.  £t 4  supposer  que  cela  soft vraf,  est-ce que  ce  seraft 
tr~s grave,  assez  grave,  peu  grave,  pas  grave  du  tout  1 
1  Tr~s grave 
2  ·As se z grave 
3  Peu  grave 
4  Pas  grave  du 
0  ? 
tout 
t40.  And  6Uppo~~ng U  WMe  tllue  ;  do  you  th.Lnh  th.La  ooould  be  o.  vtAy 
.6e1L.io<1.6  4.UUo.t.Lon,  aomewhat  .6e.ll.ioua,  not 40  aell..ioua,  Oil  no.t 
o.t  a.U o1ell..toua  r 
I  Ve11.y  ae11..Louo1 
t  Somewhat  4eil.Lou.6 
3  llot  o1 o aeii..Loua 
4  llot o.t  aU ae.ll.ioua 
0  , 
TREND  PARTIAL  BARO.  10.A  - Q.  161 241. 
242. 
ANNEX'  A-3 
On  a  parl~ de  poss1b111t~s d'acc1dents  dans  les cen-
trales  ~lectrfques nucaafres.  Pensant  ~  une  explosio 
nucl~afre semblable  a celle des  bombes  utflfs~es au 
Japon  au  cours  de  la  seconde  guerre  mondiale,  dfriez-
vous  qu'une  explosion  de  ce  genre  dans  l'une ou  l'autr 
des  centrales  ~lectriques  nucl~aires qui  sont  actuel-
lement  en  activit~  est  tr~s probable,  assez  probable, 
peu  probable  ou  mat!!riellement  impossible  7 
1  Tr~s probable 
2  Assez  probable 
3  Peu  probable 
4  :1at!!rielle.nent· impossible 
0  7 
A propos  des  dangers,  vofci  une  liste des  dangers  dont 
on  entend  parfois  parler a  propos  de  l'~nergie  nucl~­
aire.  Quels  sont  ceux,  dans  cette liste dont  vous 
pensez  qu'on  peut  les craindre  s~rieusement  ?  (Plu-
sieurs  r!!ponses  possibles). 
1  L'explosfon  de  1a  centrale 
2  Les  rejets radfoactffs  pendant  le fonctionnement 
courant  de  la  centrale 
3  Les  dangers  du  stockage  des  d~chets radfoactffs 
0  7 
243.  Sf  quelque  chose  de  ce  genre  se  produisait,  ~ votre 
avis, quelle  pourrait en  ~tre la  cause  :  une  panne 
technique  ou  une  d!!faillance  humaine  7 
244/ 
246. 
1  Une  panne  technique 
2  Une  d~fafllance humafne 
3  Les  deux  (ne  pas  sugg~rer) 
0  7 
On  dit aussf  d'autres choses  sur les centrales  nucl~-
aires.  Pour  chaque  opinion  que  je vafs  vous  cfter, 
pourrfez-vous  me  dire  si  vous  etes  plutot d'accord  ou 
plutot pas  d'accord  7  (ENQUETEUR  :  UNE  REPONSE  POUR 
CHAQUE  PHRASE). 
Plu- Plu-
tilt  tOt 
d'ac-pas 
~  d'ac-
cord  7 
244  245" 246 
1  Gr~ce aux  centrales  nucl~afres; on  peut 
disposer de  ressources  ~lectrfques sup-
pamenta ires 
2  2  2  Les  matf~res atomiques  utflfs~es par  les 
centrales peuvent  ~tre  vol~es par  des 
terrorfstes. 
3  3  3  L'~lectricit~ des  centrales  nucl~aires 
4  4"  4 
coOte  mofns  cher a  produire. 
Toute  Installation nucl4!alre  peut  l!tre 
ut11fs~e  secr~tement a des  fins  mflftafre 
5  5  5  La  production  nucl~afre de  1  '~lectrfcft~ 
a  un  effet favorable  sur  1  ·~conomie  g~n~-
rale du  pays. 
6  6  6 ·Tout  bien  compt~. 1  ·~nergie  ~lectrlque 
nucl~afre n'est oas  vraiment  fnt~ressante 
La  multiplication du  nombre  de  centrales 
nucH!afrcs  est dangereuse. 
8  8  8  les mesures  de  s~curft~ dans  les centrale 
nucl~afres sont  sf  rlgoureuses  qu'elles 
9"  9  9 
~lfminent pratfquement  tout danger. 
Les  multiples  mesures  de  s~curft~ mon-
trent  bien  que  les centrales sont  dan-
X  X  X 
gereuses  par  nature. 
L'~nergfe  nucl~aire est une  ~nergfe pro-
pre. 
y  y  y  Les  centrales nuclhfres  peu•1ent  ~tre 
dangereuses  pour  ceux  qui  y  travaillent. 
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241.  Peoplt havt  bten taliUng 4bou.t  .the  pou.<.b.UU.y  o6  4cc.idtn.U 
t41Wtg  pl4ct .i.n  nuc.lt4il.  poWM  pl4n.U.  Wha..t  4bou.t  4  nuctea~~. 
upl.o~.ion l-i.kt that o6  tht bomb  U4 tel  -in  Jap:tn  .i.n  ~10/Ltd Wall  IT, 
would  IJOU  a4y th4t 4n  txplo~-ion  o~ t~  type -in  one  o6  the 
nuc.lea~~.  poWM  pl4nta  now op~  ~  vvr.y Wety,  ~ome.what 
l-i.kety,  not vvr.y Wdy,  OIL  te.c.hMc.4Uy  .lmpo~·.l.bU"? 
242. 
r  vvr.v l-i.kttv 
2  Somtwlut.t l-i.kdf/ 
3  Not  vtJtf/ Wttv 
4  T  e.chn.i.cii.Uy  -impoa~-iblt 
()  , 
Aga..in,  o.bou.t  d4ng~. 1 am  go-ing  to· ment.ion  cvr.ta.i.n  d4ngvr.a 
whieh ptoplt ~omet.<mu mtnt.i.on  when  talk.i.ng  4bou.t  nuc.lt4il. 
poWtJt  ~tauo~. Wh.i.ch  o6  thut dangvr.a  do  you  be.Utvt one 
1110.1/  havt  IL11.4aOn  to aii.Jt.ioU4l1J  WOILILIJ  o.bou.t  ?  (SEVERAL  ANSWERS 
POSSIBLE). 
I  Tht  txplo~-ion o6  the powtiL  ~t4t.i.on 
t  Tht IL4d.io4ct.i.vt go.a eoU4  ~a-io~ wh.Uat  the pow·II.IL  at4t.i.on 
~  woiLIWtg 
3  :'0411gii.IL  o6  ato!Lo.ge  o6  IL4d.io4ct.i.vt  ~<t~att 
0  , 
243.  16  auch 4 th.i.ng  1<t1a  to happen,  -in  yOUIL  op.i.n.ion  wlnt could  be. 
.tht Jtll.4aon  6oJt  th.i.a  :  4  techn.i.co.l  b!Le.a.kdown  OIL  4  human  II.ILILOIL  ? 
I  A teehn-ico.l  b!Lto.kdown 
2  An  luuno.n  fi.MOJt 
3  Both  (don't auggut} 
()  , 
244/ A numbvr.  o6  othvr.  th.i.nga  allt  ~o..ut 4bou.t  nuc.lta.ll  powvr.  ~t4t.i.o~. 
246.  FoJt  to.eh  ~to.temtnt I  Jtto.d  to  you,  could  you  tell mt  whtthtJt  vou 
tend to 4gJttt OJt  cl.Uo.gJttt  f  ( lntt.ltu.i.e.wvr.  :  one  o.~WM 6oiL  ea.ch 
~tmtnt). 
Tend  Tend 
to  to 
4gJtee  d-Uo.-
--~.!. 
244  t4S  246 
Th4111u.  to  nuc.lea.ll  powell  ~t4t.i.o~,  we  1.1utU  have 
4Uo.il4ble  tU!to.  ILUOwteu  o6  tteet!L.i.cUy. 
t  2  Atom.ic.  mo.tvr..i.o.U  u1.td  .i.n  thue at4t.i.o~ cout.d·  be 
atolen by ttMowta  • 
3  3  Eleet!L.i.e.ity  61Lom  nuc.lll.a.ll  powvr.  ~  ehea.pvr.  .to 
p!Loduce.  ,1  • 
4  4  4  Anv  nuc.tefv.  -i~tallo.t.i.on eo.n  be  l.t.CILttlf/  put to 
uo~e  6oiL  mU-it41Ly  p.Vtpollu. 
s  s  Nuc.lll.a.ll  powvr.  p!Loduet.i.on  ho.a  o.  6o.uowto.ble  t6  6  eet 
on  the genvr.o.l  economy  o6  the count!Ly. 
6  6  6  T4/Ung  eue!Lyth.i.ng  .i.nto  4CCount,  piLOduc.i.ng  eltc· 
t!L.i.e.it'l  by  nuc.lll.a.ll  powtiL  -ia  not ILtJJ.Uy  woJt.thwh.i.le. 
1  1  The  .expo.~.ion o6  the numbvr.  o6  nuc.lll.a.ll  poWI!IL 
at4t.i.o~ ~  do.ng tJtoU4 • 
' 
The  l.o.6ttv mea.awtu  to.ken  o.t  nuc.lea~~.  poWM  1..t.o.-
t.i.o~ aile  1.0  l.tJL.i.ct  that .they e.Um.i.no.te  nto.!Lly 
o.U the do.ng tJt. 
9  The  numvr.oU4  ay1>.ttm~.  o6  aecwtUy  p!Leco.u.t.ion~>  aile 
4 ctta.ll .ind.ic.o.t-ion  that by  the.i.IL  ue!Ly  no..tt111e 
powelL  l.t4t.i.ona  41Le  do.ngvr.ou11. 
X  X  X  llucleaJL  powvr.  -ia  4  clean  6o'lm  o6  envr.gy. 
v  v  v  lluc.leaJL  powvr.  at4t.i.o~ co.n  be  do.ngii.ILoul.  6oiL  the 
people that woJtk  -in them. -68-
\NNEX  A-3 
.7J  Est-ce  qu•a  votre avls les  diff~rents moyens  d'informatio 
;o.  que  je vats  vous  citer informent  bien les  gens  comme  vous 
sur les  probl~es de  1  ·~nergie en  g~n~ral, les  informent 
mal  ou  ne  les  tnforment  pas  du  tout sur  les  probl~es de 
l'lmer!Jie  ? 
bien mal  Pas  ? 
du 
-!!!.!!!.-
247  248  249  250 
1  1  1  1  les  journaux  quotidien 
2  2  2  2  Les  hebdomadaires et les revues 
3  3  3  3  La  radio 
4  4  4  4  La  t~l~vlslon 
5  5  5  5  Les  ~coles et les unlversith. 
;!J  En  rcgardant cettc 11ste IMontrcr  1 1st")  rnurriez-vous  me 
;1.  dire  la~ucllc ou  lcs~elles de  ces  autorit~s .devrait  (ent 
avulr  1,1  rc~pun~o1ullll~ JlOUr  Ml~rmlncr  ~~~  orlenl.1Liun~ 
et les  re~les de  la  r~glementation dans  chacun  des  do-
maines  suivants  ?  (Enqueteur  :  plusieurs  r~ponses possi-
les  pour chaque  ligne). 
Auto- Gou- Commu-
rtt~s  verne-naut~ 
loca- ment  euro-
l!L  1f!:.:.l  p~en  ne  1. 
il  2  3  0  Conservation de  la  nat~re 
i2  2  3  0  Pollution  de  1 'air 
;1  2  3  0  Pollution  de  1 'eau 
;t  2  3  0  La  s~curit~ des  centrales  nucl~aire 
~5  2  3  0  La  protection  des  especes  menac~es 
~5  2  3  0  La  localisation des  nouvelles  ins-
tallations  tndustrielles 
i7  2  3  0  La  recherche  de  nouvelles  formes 
d'~nergie. 
;a.  Votre  foyer  poss~de-t-11  1 'un ou  1 'autre  des  i!quipements 
sutvants  ? 
I  Une  ou  plusieurs  automobiles 
2  Une  mota  d'au mains  125  cm3 
3  Le  chauffage  central 
4  Une  machine  pour  laver le linge 
5  Une  machine a laver la  vaisselle 
6  Un  chauffe-eau  ~lectrique ou  au  gaz  lnd~pendant du 
syst~e gen~ral  du  chauffage 
7  Un  refrig~rateur 
8  Un  cong~lateur  independant  du  r~frigerateur 
9  Des  outils de  bricolages  electriques 
X  Une  t~li!vision en  couleur 
Y  Un  t~l  i!phone 
0  1 
I.  AU  COtiNTRTES  EXCEPT  VENMARK,  GREECE,  !RflANV. 
241/  !  am  go.C:rrg  .to  me.n.Uon  d.C:Uellen.t  Utt!f~  .C:..  •u!Uclt  we  get .C:..6oil-
250.  ma.U.on  11bou..t  enellgy pitoblem-6  <.n  geneltlll.  Foil  Mch  one,  c11n 
you  teU me  whe.thell  .in  youJt  op.i....:On  .they h.eep people  tik.e 
youJt~e'-~  weU  <.n~oJimed,  bo.d!y  ,c:,.~oJIIIIed  Oil  11<.ue  no  <.n~uJtmll.t<.on 
on  Uell!l!f  p11.0bl~m4  ? 
welt lxldly Not  11t  1 
l1ll.  ---------
?.41  241  249  250 
I  I  I  I  Ott.Uy  new6ptpe11.4 
2  2  2  2  Pell..(ocU.ca.u  11nd  m11g11z.C:..u 
3  3  3  3  Rad..:o 
4  4  4  4  Teleuu..:On 
s  s  s  5  School.&  11nd  u...C:ve11.4.U..:u 
zsr I  Who  do  you.  think 6hou.(d  httve  U.6pon~-i.blllly  ~OIL Hgulat-i.rrg 
2S7 • .  tht.  ~oUo!Ali"!J  pitobltm4  :  .the  ~Uli.OpMn Corrrnu.n..:.ty,  (lluportde.n.t'  ~) 
m..U.onll(  govCII.rlment,  ull  (llUpunden i '~)  locat aut.Jw~  {.1 {c6  ? 
(  S~vell<Ll 11r.4Welt4  po6.6.C:ble  on  Mch  Une ){Show  CMd) 
251 
2S2 
253 
254 
255 
256 
251 
LoCill  N<i.Uo- Tlte  fu-
llu..tho- nl1l  llopean 
/L.i.t..i.u  govell- commu-
--- nmen.t  Mt!J 
t 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0  NlltuJte  COII4 ellV11WII 
0  Mit.  poUu..t<.on 
0  ~ell pol.fu..Uon 
0 Nu.clellil  pllln.t  .61l~C!.t!f 
0  Pilo.tec.t..:on  o~ endllngelled  4pec.C:u 
0 SU.C:ng  o6  .inrlu.HA.ill(  rlcvelopncnt 
0 Rue1111.ch  6oll  new  typu o6  eneJtg.iu 
2S8.  Vo  you.  httve  1111y  o~ .tlte  6oUO<Uing  11ppUo.ncu  oil  uehi.c..lu  l1.t 
home  1 
I  A Call.  OJL  Call~ 
2  A mo.toilb.C:h.e.  (I 25  cc  OJL  mollel 
3  Cen.t/ltl.f  heating 
4  A Lll1<! lt<.rrg  mach-ine. 
S  A d<.-6 luau. hell 
6  An  .C:ntlependlln.t  elec.tll.i.c  OJL  gM  LU:ttell-hM.tell 
1  A .te6il.tgellll.tOll 
8  A deep-6-teeze Upllllll.te.  6Jlom  .te6il.tgeltl1.toll 
9  Elec.til<.c  po~  tool-6 
X  A colou.il  .televu<.on 
Y  Tdepho11e 
0  ? 
QUESTION  TO  THE  INTERVIEWER  :  Plea.6e  .tllfze the m11p  ~howi.ng the 11c..tua.l  ~..:..tua.t.i.on  o6  the.  nu.cleall  powell  plo.nl.6  .C:n  fuJtope, 
<tttrf  tool1  tlt  tJ1r.  Mrn  n~u·~r !/''"  Mr.  intr.~•·irwin!f.  A6  ~~~~  11.1>  you  cnn  H.r.,  {./>  th~  11rMr~t 
nuclrall pt11nt  4hown  on  tJ1e.  r1111p  11C  11  d.i~ tance.  o6  lu.~>  tl111n  I 00  km  (Oil  60  mi.tu)  011  about 
llutt  ,r u  l1111c~  o.~  '"'' ~ ,.  .t i  ~ t  <Ill t  l'  tl~  c•tu' t !!•'"  t  ~ r  r l' 
1  Leu  .thll•t  roo  km/60  m.Uu 
2  About thtlt  ~.tllnce 
3  Molle  .tJuxn  roo  km/60  m.Uu 
0 Can't te.U -69-
ANNEX  B-1 
THE  LEADERSHIP  INDEX 
What  is  an  op1n1on  leader?  It is  someone  who,  in carrying out  certain 
social  functions,  generally exerts  on  the  opinions  of others  more  influence 
than  the  others  exert  on  him.  If all the members  of a  social group were 
equivalent  and  interchangeable  in the  formation  of  the opinions,  attitudes 
and  behaviours  in  the  group,  the  group would  continue .to  function  in some 
way  even if a  certain member  disappeared.  The  leader is  the  person who 
changes  things:  he  influences  the others  more  than he  is himself  influenced 
by  them,  and  not  only occasionally but  in a  relatively constant  and  foresee-
able  fashion. 
One  of  the  aims  of market  research,  opinion polls  and  more  generally research 
on  social psychology is  to  pinpoint  leaders.  Only  three ways  of doing  this 
are  known: 
1  - The  sociometric  study of  the  respective  influences  in  a  given group,  but 
this method  is really only  practicable  in a  laboratory or in  small 
groups. 
2  - The  interrogation of  informants  who  identify  those who,  in their opinion, 
are  leaders  in  a  given  group.  This  method  has  the  same  limitation as 
the  previous  one  and  in addition may  pinpoint "persons of distinction", 
i.e.  people  occupying  a  social situation regarded  as  important,  rather 
than "leaders"  genuinely  involved  in the  life of  the  group. 
3  - Automatic  selection of  leaders  by  means  of  a  survey;  this method  consists 
of defining  leaders  as  individuals having certain characteristics giving 
them what  is generally  accepted  to be  an  attitude of leadership:  interest 
in certain problems,  scope  and  intensity of activity in the  life of  the 
group. 
The  last method  was  adopted because it appeared  the  only  one  that  could be 
used  in practical  fashion  in opinion polls  on  representative  samp~.es  of 
numerous  and  diverse  populations. 
The  analysis  of  the  results  gathered  in previous  polls  showed  that  it was 
statistically significant to construct  a  leadership  index on  the basis of 
the  replies  given by all  those  interviewed  to  two  questions  concerning  their 
inclination to discuss  politics with  friends  and  their tendency  to  persuade 
others  of  an  opinion  that  they hold  strongly  themselves. 
This  index was  constructed with  four  degrees,  the highest  degree  correspond-
ing  to  those  whom  we  regard  as  being  opinion  leaders  (approximately  15%  of 
the European  population),  and  the  lowest  degree  corresponding  to non-leaders 
(approximately  25%);  the  two  intermediate  degrees  correspond  to  individuals 
who  have  slightly more  and  slightly less  leadership qualities  than  the 
average  member  of  the  general  public. 
The  following  table  shows  how  the  leadership  index was  constructed: 
Persuade  others 
often  sometimes  rarely  never  don't know 
Discuss  politics  ... 
often 
sometimes 
never 
don't  know 
++ 
+ 
++ 
+ 
+  +  + -70-
ANNEX  B-2 
EXTRACT  FROM  "THE  EUROPEAN  PUBLIC'S  ATTITUDES  TO  SCIENTIFIC  AND  TECHNICAL 
DEVELOPMENT",  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES,  FEBRUARY  1979 
Question  asked  in October  1978:  Now  I  am  going  to  ask  your opinion about a 
number of possible scientific research projects3  or aims  to which 
scientific research can  be  directed  towards.  Naturally3  the 
research that is needed to succeed in these different areas  requires 
effort3  time  and  money.  It may  also involve some  risks.  In  each 
case  I  am  going  to ask you if you,  yourself,  would  say  that this 
project is either worthwhile,  of no  particular interest,  or whether 
it carries with it unacceptable risks. 
To  increase  the number  of ob-
servation satellites which will 
circle the  earth to gather  and 
re-transmit  information  (for 
telecommunications,  detection of 
the  resources  on  and  under  the 
earth,  etc,) 
To  develop medical  and  surgical 
research  on human  organ  trans-
plants 
To  collect  together by  computer 
the  greatest possible  amount  of 
information on  each  person  in 
Britain so  that it is possible, 
if it's needed,  to know  all that 
can  be  required  on  each  person 
To  speed  up  research  into syn-
thetic  food  so  as  to be  able  to 
produce  food  on  an  industrial 
scale which  is not  made  from 
farm  animals  or  farm products 
To  develop nuclear power  stations 
that will  use  atomic  energy  for 
the production of electricity 
To  carry  out  experiments  on  the 
transmission of hereditary 
characteristics which  could 
make  it possible to  improve  the 
qualities  of  living species 
To  spend,  if necessary,  a  great 
deal  of  m~ney to find  and  develop 
new  sources  of  energy 
To  develop  synthetic materials 
to replace  natural  raw materials 
such  as  wood,  iron,  copper.  etc. 
Worth-
while 
55 
82 
22 
23 
44 
33 
76 
54 
No  par-
ticular 
interest 
20 
6 
24 
21 
9 
19 
12 
24 
Unaccept-
able  risks 
13 
7 
45 
49 
36 
35 
5 
12 
Don't 
know 
12 
5 
9 
7 
11 
13 
7 
10 - 71 
ANNEX  B-3 
THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  THE  STAKES 
1978-1982 
SOME  SAY  THAT  IF  WE  DON'T  CONTINUE  TO  , , , 
DEVELOP  NUCLEAR  POWER,  WE  SHALL  SOON  HAVE 
CUT  DOWN  ON  ELECTRICITY  CONSUMPTION. 
TRUE 
NOT  TRUE 
DON'T  KNOW 
To/ 
I 
I 
19781 
EC  ·9 
56 
30 
14 
100 
1982 
F.C  9 
47 
31 
22 
100 
1  Source:  "The  European 
Development", 
Public' slttitudes to Scientific and  Technical 
Commisidn  of  the  European  Communities,  1979. -72-
ANNEX  B-4 
EXTRACT  FROM  EUROBAROMETER  No.  15  (pp,  34-35) 
COMMUNITY  POPULARITY  RATING 
An  index  should be  constructed  in  such  a  way  as  to provide  more  refined 
and more  sensitive  information  than  is  conveyed  in the  replies  to  the 
questions making  up  the  index. 
The  index used here has  five  levels  ranging  from  5  - very  ''pro"  - to  1  -
very "anti".  The  central point  on  the  scale  - don't  care or don't know  -
is  therefore  3.  It was  constructed  on  the basis of  the  answers  to  two 
questions  as  follows: 
Community  membership: 
A good  thing  Neither  good  A bad  thing 
nor bad  (or 
don't  know) 
If it we~e scrapped: 
. regret  5  4  3  . indiffe\ce 
(or don'  knows)  4  3  2 
. relief  3  2  1 
\ 
1 
\ 
The  sensitivit~ of the  index produces  some  interesting conclusions: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The  proportion of  interviewees at  level  1  on  the  scale  (very "anti") 
is generally very  low.  Even  in Denmark  and  the United Kingdom,  where 
at  times  it  s  as  high  as  25%  to  30%,  extreme  opposition  does  not 
seem very sta le.  In both  countries,  and  to  a  lesser extent  in Ireland, 
there is  a  cer ain  fluidity  among  the  Community's  opponents,  who  tend 
to vacillate  de  ending  on  the  circumstances between hostile  indifference 
(or a  prejudice  gainst)  and out-and-out hostility. 
At  the  other end \:f the  scale  the  percentage at levelS ("very "pro") 
remained  fairly  s~ble between  1973  and  1977,  peaking  in most  countries 
in  1975,  but  dropped substantially between  1977  and  1981,  especially 
in Belgium  (from  3g7o  to  21%)  and  in Ireland  (from 43%  to  28%).  Only  in 
Luxembourg,  the  Neth\~rlands  and  Italy has  the  ardent  support  remained 
constantly high:  four  to six in every  ten  interviewed. 
This  decline  in support· in a  number  of countries has  a  curious effect 
which has  hitherto passed unnoticed owing  to  the  absence  of  a  satis-
factory  indicator.  The  proportion of ardent  supporters  is now  the 
same  in countries with  as  different  a  Community  history as  Belgium and 
Denmark  (21%  and  19%)  or France  and  Ireland  (28%);  Greece  also belongs 
to this group  (24%), 
There  is less  to be  said about  those at  the  intermediate  points  on  the 
scale  (from  2  to 4).  The  factors  involved are  fairly diverse;  in-
difference is  definitely  a  dominant  factor at  level  3  and  probably  a 
contributory factor  at  levels  2  (fairly "anti")  and  4  (fairly "pro"). -73-
ANNEX  B-5 
', 
VARIANCE  ANALY~IS OF  TWO  MAJOR  ARGUMENTS  FOR  AND  AGAINST  NUCLEAR  POWER  STATIONS 
(Cramer  coefficl/Emt  V  t  i.e.  square  root  of  }?f  .  )  \,  no.  o  persons 
Variables  in Table  on 
p.  60 
Sex 
Age 
Age  on  completion of 
full-time  education 
Leadership rating 
Position on  the left/ 
right  scale 
Nationality 
Other variables  1 
Occupation 
Size of residential area 
Attitudes  towards  movements: 
- anti-nuclear 
- anti-pollution 
- ecology 
- nuclear disarmament 
Religious  concern 
ECONOMIC 
ARGUMENT 
If we  don't  continue 
to develop nuclear 
powert  we  shall have 
to cut  down  on 
electricity consump-
tion  (True/Not  true) 
Cramer  V 
.161 
.072 
.099 
.144 
.153 
.206 
.109 
.029 
.231 
.141 
.173 
.094 
System of values  (materialist/ 
post-materialist)  .137 
SAFETY 
ARGUMENT 
The  safety measures 
taken at nuclear power 
stations  are  so strict 
that  they eliminate 
nearly all the  danger 
(Tend  to  agree/Tend  to 
disagree) 
Cramer  V 
.131 
.101 
.110 
.134 
.185 
.175 
.111 
.055 
.283 
.125 
.188 
.092 
.143 
1  The  variance  study has  been  applied to different variablest  of basic 
interestt which  also  appeared  in the Eurobarometer questionnaire. -74-
ANNEX  B-6 
ATTEMPT  TO  EVOLVE  A  STRUCTURAL  PATTERN  FROM  THE  ATTITUDES  TO'HARDS  NUCLEAR  ENERGY 
One  of  the most  striking  things  to have  emerged  from  this  report  about  atti-
tud~s  towards  nuclear power  stations is their diversity.  It was  this  that 
prompted  an  attempt  to  discern  the main  factors  behind  them.  Some  indications 
~ave already  been  given:  the  uncertainty of  some  Europeans,  the  considerable 
/  degree  to which  the  opponents  or  supporters  of nuclear  power  stations may  be 
mobilized or  the  existence of a  certain amount  of  consensus  as  regards  the 
economic  benefits  and  dangers  inherent  in  any  loss  of  control.  Since  such 
indications  do  not,  as  they  stand,  provide  an  overall  picture,  a  more  systematic 
analysis  of  the  component  parts of attitudes  towards  nuclear  power  stations 
seemed  appropriate. 
This  analysis was  based  on  the  following  question  which~ takes  full  account  of 
the  range  of attitudes ,1  i 
Question:  A number  of other things  are  said about 
For  each  statement I  read to  you~  could you  tell me 
or disagree? 
Thanks  to nuclear  power  stations,  we  shall have 
available extra resources  of electricity. 
Atomic materials  used  in these  stations  could 
be  stolen by  terrorists. 
Electricity  from nuclear  power  is  cheaper  to 
produce. 
Any  nuclear  installation can be  secretly put  to 
use  for military  purposes. 
Nuclear  power  production has  a  favourable  effect 
on  the general  economy  of the  country. 
Taking everything  into account,  producing elec-
tricity by nuclear  power  is not  really worthwhile. 
The  expansion of the  number  of nuclear  power 
stations  is  dangerous. 
The  safety measures  taken  at  nuclear power 
stations  are  so strict that  they eliminate 
nearly all the  dangers. 
The  numerous  systems  of  security precautions  are 
a  clear indication that  by  their very nature 
power  stations  are  dangerous. 
Nuclear  power  is  a  clean  form  of energy. 
Nuclear  power  stations  can  be  dangerous  for -the 
people  that work  in th.em. 
nuclear pouJer  stations, 
whether you  tend to agree 
Tend. to 
agree. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
X 
y 
Tend  to 
disagree 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
X 
y 
Don't 
know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
X 
y 
1  See  Part  IV  of this report:  The  Image  of Nuclear  Power  Stations. -75-
The  interviewee was  given  a  choice  of three  responses  to each  of  the  eleven 
statements:  tend  to  agree,  tend  to  disagree  or don't  know.  A total of  33 
attitudes were  thus  covered  by  this  one  question.  The  object of  the 
analyses  was  to identify the  main  axes  synthesizing  as  far  as  possible all 
33  attitudes. 
The  most  appropriate  solution was  a  procedure  known  as  factor  analysis  of 
correspondence.  The  results of this  analysis  are  given below,l 
Three  main  axes  were  identified,  The  first  runs  from perplexity to certain-
ty:  on  the  one  hand,  the don't  knows,  on  the  other,  those with  the  most 
decisive views.  This  axis  represents  the  formation  of opinion. 
A second  axis  indicates  polarisation of attitude:  support of or opposition 
to nuclear energy. 
The  third  and  last axis  describes  the  degree  of mobilisation associated 
with each  attitude:  from  the  most  strongly held attitudes,  be  they  for  or 
against nuclear power,  to  the  most  weakly motivated. 
For  each  of the  33  attitudes  there  is  a  point  on  the  three  axes.  For 
example,  disagreeing with  the  idea that  the  atomic materials  used  in power 
stations  could  be  stolen by  terrorists  indicates  certainty with  regard  to 
nuclear matters,  support  for nuclear energy  and  considerable mobilisation 
on  this  subject. 
The  other attitudes  studied  can  be  characterised in the  same  way. 
(See  Table  A). 
1  For  the  sake  of clarity,  we  have  not  gone  into the details of this 
complex method  of analysis.  Anyone  interested in the  subject will, 
however,  find  further  details at  the  end  of this Annex. -76-
TABLE  A - POSITIONS  OF  THF:  33  ATTITUDES  STUDIED  ON  THE  THREE  FACTOR 
ANALYSIS  AXES1 
Axis  1 
Formation of 
opinion 
Axis  2 
Polarisation 
Axis  3 
Mobilisation 
rerplexity TendencyCertaint:ypppositionNeutralit:ySupport  weak  moderate  strong 
•  I 
.;rE.;;x;.;,tr"a~s~u~p';:"p~l~ie;:,;s:....:o:.::f--:::el:.:e:.::c~tn:..:":;.c;;.i  t~y'-..:t~h:.::a;:;n:;:;k:::s~to::......::n;:.u=.;;:cl.ear  power stations 
2.  Tend  to agree  I  ••  I •  r·  •  3.  Tend to disagree 
1.  Don't know  • 
Risk of terrorists'  stealing atomic  materials  from  power stations 
5.  Tend to agree 
6.  Tend to disagree 
4.  Don't know  I • I 
• 
Electricity  from  nuclear power is  cheaoer 
8.  Tend to agree 
9.  Tend to disagree 
1.  Don't know  I • 
• 
•  • 
Secret  use of nuclear power stations  fcir  military 
n:  i=~~ ~~  ~:::ree· I •  •  •  10.  Don't know 
• 
•  • 
Nuclear power production has  a  favourable  effect on  the  econom_y 
14.  Tend to agree  I 
15.  Tend to  disagree 
13.  Don't know  • 
worthwhile 
17.  Ten  to agree 
18.  Tend  to  disagree 
16.  Don't  know  I  • 
•  •  • 
•  •  • 
• 
• 
Expansion of the number  of  nuclear power stations is  dangerous 
ZO.  Tend to agree  I 
21.  Tend to disagree  • 
19.  Don't know  •  • 
Safety measures  eliminate nearly  all  the danger 
23.  Tend to agree  I 
24.  Tend  to disagree 
22.  Don't know  •  I 
•  • 
• 
•  • 
• 
•  • 
• 
•  • 
• 
• 
•  • 
• 
The numerous security 
26.  Tend to agree 
precautions show  that power stations are dangerous 
27.  Tend to disagree 
25.  Don't  know  I 
• 
• 
Nuclear ]ower is  a  clean  form  of energy 
29.  Ten  to agree 
30.  Tend to disagree  I 
28.  Don't know  • 
Nuclear ~ower stations  can  be  dangerous 
32.  Ten  to agree  0  33.  Tend to  disagree 
31.  Don't know  • 
for 
• 
•  • 
those 
• 
• 
• 
who  work 
• 
• 
there 
•  • 
• 
•  • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
,. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•  • 
•  •  • 
• 
• 
• 
•  • 
• 
•  • 
• 
• 
•  e 
•  • 
• 
•  • 
1  The number assigned to each attitude serves to identify it in the table of 
results  given below. -77-
A comparison of  the  relative positions  makes  it possible  to distinguish 
seven homogenous,  well-characterised attitude  groups  (Table  B). 
TABLE  B - DIAGRAM  OF  ATTITUDES  TOWARDS  NUCLEAR  POWER  STATIONS 
AXIS  1  AXIS  2  AXIS  3  Type  of  Attitudes 
attitude  observed 
Certainty  Support  Strong  Active  Denial  of  loss 
support  of control 
Certainty  Support  Moderate  Qualified  Assertion  of eco-
support  nomic  and  technical 
benefits 
Perplexity  Support  Strong  Favourable  Perplexity vis-a-
uncertainty  vis  risks 
Perplexity  Neutrality  Moderate  Perplexity  Perplexity vis-a-
vis  technical  and 
economic  aspects 
Tendency  Opposition  Heak  Hostile  Fear of  loss  of 
tendency  control 
Certainty  Opposition  Moderate  Qualified  Assertion of risks 
opposition 
Certainty  Opposition  Strong  Strong  Denial  of  economic 
opposition  and  technical 
benefits 
The  final  result of the  analysis,  this  diagram,  is highly  instructive. 
Four  points,  in particular,  are  worth  emphasizing: 
- those  who  adopt  a  strong position on  the  question of nuclear  power  do 
so  by  disputing  the  arguments  advanced  by  the  opposition:  the  supporters 
- the  dangers  inherent  in  any  loss of control,  the  opponents  - the  eco-
nomic  and  technical benefits; 
- those whose  position is qualified  tend  to  assert  a  single  aspect:  the 
supporters  - the  economic  advantages,  the  opponents  - the  risks; -78-
perplexity can  take  two  forms:  neutral  perplexity  in the  face  of  the 
technicalities of nuclear  power  and  perplexity tending  towards  a  favour-
able  stance,  which  is more  concerned with  risks; 
- those  who  exhibit  a  "tendency",  i.e.  the beginnings  of  an  opinion,  are 
generally hostile towards  nuclear power. 
Finally,  for  those who  are  interested  in the  subject,  we  have  provided  some 
technical details of the  analysis. 
\ -79-
Variables  having  the  greatest absolute effect on  Axis  1 (Percentage  of explicit varlance-19.7) 
Negative  Coordinates  Positive Coordinates 
Absolute  Reliability  Absolute  Rellab1H ty 
Name  effect  Coefficient  Coordinate  Name  [ffect  Coeffl cl ent  Coordinate 
18  0.0251  o.i970  •0.4946  1  OoQ810  0,4054  ••  6-\01 
21  o.o238  Ool~OO  •0.7102  16  0.0798  Oo4655  1o1653 
12  Oo0193  Ool053  •0,6377  22  o.ons  0,4335  1oZ266 
14  o.0190  Ool§19  •0.:)887  25  Oo0746  0,3825  1o4554 
23  Oo0190  Ool400  •0.4483  13  Oo0718  Oolt220  lo0919 
27  Oo0186  OoQ981t  •0.6702  28  o.o713  0,4162  1o1003 
33  o.o185  0o0933  •0.7641  19  Oo!)6fl2  0.3299  io4939 
6  Oo0181  0  ·1173  •0,4873  ..  0.0612  0.3322  1.1525 
8  o.o1n  Ool297  •0.4357  10  o.oS82  0.3326  1o0243 
29  0.0162  0.1?60  •0,4001  31  o.o58o  0,2895  1.3880 
9  o.0104  0. 0571  •0,4705  7  Oo0439  0.3136  · Oo6987 
Variables  having  the greatest absolute effect on  Axis  2 (Percentage of explicit  varlance•15.~) 
Negative  Coordinates  Positive Coordinates 
Absolute  Rellabi H ty  Absolute  Reltablll ty 
Name  Effect  Coefficient  Coordinate  Na11e  Effect  Coefficient  Coordinate 
21  0.0788  0.3345  -i.i392  17  0,0789  0,3808  0.9414 
27  Oo:l579  0.~385  •1.!)432  21t  Oo0669  0.3570  o.7837 
33  o.o57l  0.~236  •1.1830  3  Oo0630  0.2509  lo1818 
23  o.ott62  0.~645  •0.6162  15  0.0614  0.2573  1.0343 
18  0.0443  Oo2J04  •0.5794  30  0,0498  0.2  ..  23  o.7422 
29  Oo0337  o.~QJ5  •0.5084  20  Oo041t9  Oo'!S48  Oo4765 
8  Oo0305  0.1736  •0,5041  9  0.0403  0.1713  0.8154 
14  Oo0274  0.~037  •0.4113  26  OoQ314  0.3194  o.3984 
12  Oo0230  OoQ978  -0.6145  32  0.0256  0,3229  Oo3436 
31  Oo0179  0.0696 
1  •0,6804  5  0,0244  o ••  563  0,4186 
6  o.o172  o.o87o  '/  •0,4196  ll  OoOZ1S  0.1636  Oo31'119 
19  Oo0165  o.o~  •0.6574·  7.  Oo0011  o.oo59  Oo0959 
2  o.o133  0,1~  •0.2504  13  o.ooo1  0,0030  0,0922 
Variables  bavlng  the  greatest absolute effect on  Axis  3 (Percentage  of explicit varlance•6.5) 
Negative  Coordinates  Positive Coordinates 
Absolute  ReHabiH ty  Absolute  Reltablll ty 
Name  Effect  Coefficient  1  Coordinate  Na.e  Effect  Coefficient  Coordinate 
15  Oo1340  O,ZJ70  •0.9926  ~  0,0445  o. izo  1  0.3671 
3  0.1085  0.)824  -1.0076  11  O,Q431  0.1383  0.3328 
9  Oo10S4  Ool1!91  -0.(1565  14  O.g394  0.1239  0.3207 
12  0. 0717  0.1287  •0.7050  2  o.o353  o.p74  0.2651 
27  0.0574  OoQ997  •0.6746  26  0.0304  0.1304  0.2545 
33  Qo0517  o.oe56  -0.7318  32  0.0281  0,1497  o.ZJJ9 
6  '),0314  O.Q~69  •0,3682  20  0,0210  0.08'98  0.2117 
21  o.o312  o.oss9  •0.4658  8  o.o156  0.0375  0.2342 
31  Oo0270  OoQ44?  •0.5423  7  o.o111  0.0273  0.2(162 
30  o.o22e  O,Q467  •0.3260  29  o.o116  0,0296  0,1939 
17  Oo0220  0.0~49  •0.3233  18  Oo0073  0.0188  o.1.;28 
19  o.ous  0.0189  •0.3575  16  o.oo?J  o.oo45  0.1142 
25  o.ouo  O.Q\86  •0,3209  23  o.oo11  0,0026  0,0(1,06 
4  0.0092  OoOlt.4  •0.2557  13  o.oooe  o.oo15  Oo0662 
1  o.oon  0.0117  -0.2773  28  o.ooo6  o.ooll  0.0562 